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Affirmative Action and Judicial Incoherence
ROBERT C. POWER*
The most infuriating provision of the United States Constitution is the
Equal Protection Clause. The elegance of its command-"No state
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws"'-is deceptive. The role of equality under our Constitution has been the
subject of constant debate. While some controversies over the nature of
constitutional equality appear to be settled, others continue to perplex scholars,
courts, and the public. In the 1990s the most serious disagreements concern the
constitutional status of affirmnative action programs, which are designed to
produce equality in the future by creating mequality in the present.2
Two major themes emerge from much of the recent thought about
affirmative action. On one hand, practical reasoning about effective policy-
making, American history, politics, and the spirit of equality suggest the
propriety of, and perhaps the need for, affirmative action in many settings. On
the other hand, abstract reasoning about "equality" calls most forms of
affirmative action into question.3 The 1991 appointment of Clarence Thomas to
* Professor of Law, Widener Umversity School of Law; Professor of Law, Qummpiac
College School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; A.B.,
Brown Umversity; J.D., Northwestern Umversity School of Law. Numerous colleagues and
fi-ends helped in the research and drafting. I am particularly indebted to Leigh Hunt
Greenhaw, Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Margaret V Sachs, and Harry L. Witte.
1 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 "Affirmative action" is necessarily a phrase with several different meanings. This
Article uses it to refer to those programs that overtly favor members of one or more
minority groups in matters such as employment, school admissions, or contracting.
Affirmative action is probably not the best term for such programs, as it
euphemistically obscures the fact that racial discrimination is involved. My colleague,
Widener law professor Harry Witte, points out that "reverse discrimination" is a better
phrase, and that supporters of affirmative action have been unduly defensive m eschewing
it. Discrimination means only "different treatment," but the reluctance of supporters to use
the phrase allows opponents to suggest that the negative connotations of prejudice apply in
this setting as well. See KENT GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION 15-16 (1983). Tins Article nonetheless uses the phrase affirmative action
because the trend in discourse in the 1990s is for descriptive or neutral analyses to use that
phrase while critical discussions continue to call it reverse discrimination.
3 These statements are necessarily oversimplified. There are, of course, pragmatic
concerns about some of the possible effects of affirmative action. These include increased
racial polarization. Gary Charles Leedes, The Richmond Set-Asde Case: A Tougher Look at
Affinnative Action, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 7 (1989); Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court
and Affinnative Action: Whose Cassification is Suspect?, 17 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 483,
487-89 (1990), and assumptions or self-doubt about ability, Shelby Steele, A Negative Vote
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the Supreme Court illustrates these conflicting themes. Justice Thomas was
named to replace Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first African American on the
Court, and President Bush plainly recognized the symbolic and substantive
value of his own race-conscious decisionmaking in this regard, his public
statements to the contrary notwithstanding. 4 Yet, Justice Thomas is himself a
strong opponent of affirmative action on legal grounds, as reflected in his
conduct both before and after he joined the Court.5
on Affnmnative Action, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 13, 1990, at 46, 48; Antonm Scalia, The
Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 154-55. Still, support for affirmative action
has focused on its practical utility in achieving a non-racist society. See, e.g., Randall
Kennedy, Persuason and Dmtr A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv.
L. REv. 1327, 1329 (1986).
4 President Bush's statements about the Thomas nomination included assertions that
Thomas was the best candidate for the position on the merits and that race was not a factor,
but the fact that Thomas was an African American was "so much the better." Excerpts from
News Conference Announcing Court Normnee, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1991, at A14. The
Waslngton Post reported that "[aidministration officials said Bush concentrated almost
exclusively on, minority or female candidates." John E. Yang & Sharon LaFramere, Bush
Picks Thonuisfor Supreme Court, WASH. POST, July 2, 1991, at Al. Neil A. Lewis of the
New York Tnes suggested that the public recognized the President's denial of race-
consciousness as "hyperbole common in such circumstances." Neil A. Lewis, Thomas's
Journey on Path of Self-Help, N.Y. TMES, July 7, 1991, at 12. Other commentatqrs were
less respectful of the President's claims. See, e.g., Joanne Jacobs, Just Give Thomas Credit
for Believing What He Believes, ATLANTA CONST., July 10, 1991, at A9 (suggesting "Bush
had his fingers crossed"); Mike Royko, Read My Lips, No Quota for Court, Cmt. TRM.,
July 2, 1991, at 3 (describing Bush as proving his support for racial quotas); Should Race
and Gender Be Factors in Choosing Justices?, debate between Lynn Hecht Schafran and
Bruce Fern, 77 A.B.A. J., 38-39 (1991). On balance, there can be little doubt that the
President determined that Thomas was within the group of persons he deemed to be
qualified for appointment, or that the President recognized the symbolic value and political
benefit of selecting hInn over other potential nominees. Since affirmative action programs
almost always require that beneficiaries be from a group of qualified persons, the
President's action was akin to others he has attacked. Such ambivalence about affirmative
action is not umque to this President. See Neal Devins, Affirative Action After Reagan, 68
TEX. L. REV. 353, 354 (1984) (noting the Reagan administration maintained a variety of
racial set-asides and other preference programs). Sometimes even well-intentioned efforts
along this line can appear to be awkward or patronizing. The press corps, among others,
was amused at President Clinton's rigid (and repeated) insistence that his Attorney General
be a woman, even though no one would openly fault hin for seeking a more diverse
cabinet. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Washington Week in Review (PBS television broadcast,
Dec. 25, 1992) ("No males need apply").
-5 Press reports at the time of the nomination reported a variety of public statements
hostile to affirmative action. E.g., Linda Greenhouse, Bush Picks a Wild-Card, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 1991, at Al; Lewis, supra note 4, at 16; Yang & LaFremere, supra note 4,
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The Supreme Court's response to affirmative action has been incoherent.
The instability of the law is evidenced by City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.6 (Richmond) and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC7 (Metro), two
decisions in which the Court purported to settle the constitutional status of
much affirmative action. Richmond struck down a local set-aside program for
minority businesses, while Metro upheld Federal Communications Commission
preferences for minority broadcasters. Although they can be reconciled on a
technical level, the decisions in fact present dramatically different visions of the
constitutional status of benign race-conscious decisionmaking. In short, they
reveal that the Court is of several minds on this issue.
The competing visions seem incapable of resolution, and the underlying
problem is not likely to disappear for many years. The consistent conservative
majority on the Court may appear to end the legal debate by ruling consistently
and decisively against most forms of affirmative action, but this will not fully
resolve the matter for several reasons. First, the broad societal acceptance of
some forms of affirmative action, which translates into political realities such as
the Thomas appointment, means that governments will continue to enact
affirmative action plans. Second, the incoherence of the Supreme Court's
decisions will inevitably persist, with even determined majorities merely
papering over strong philosophical differences among the Justices. And third,
Supreme Court decisions are limited in effect. The affirmative action debate
will necessarily continue through political decisions that the Court, cannot
review, such as judicial nominations and electoral politics. It will also exist in
private-sphere decisions, which the Equal Protection Clause does not reach.
This is as it must be, and arguably as it should be. Even if the Supreme
Court embraced all affirmative action plans, the societal debate would continue
because the vision of equality that is hostile to affirmative action would survive
in the context of the political process as well. One reason is simple-the issue
does not tolerate clear winners and losers. Like abortion and Miranda
warnings, affirmative action touches off a deep public disagreement that no line
of Supreme Court cases can resolve. Other reasons are potentially more
complicated, such as the analytical snares created by equal protection doctrine.
In debates of this kind, the Justices of the Supreme Court are just nine more
at 6; Sidebar, WASH. POST, July 2, 1991, at 7. In 1992, several months after Thomas's
confirmation, the D.C. Circuit issued its ruling m Lanprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (1992).
In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the court struck down an affirmative action program that
gave women an advantage m the radio licensing process, even though the program
resembled the minority preference program upheld m Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990), addressed m Part II.B.
6 488 U.S. 469 (1989) [heremafter Richmond].
7 497 U.S. 547 (1990) [hereinafter Metro].
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participants in the dialogue.
This Article addresses affirmative action for what it reveals about the
difficulties of crafting coherent legal doctrines. Part I briefly describes the
nature of the equal protection guarantee and the inevitable disagreements
surrounding its application to affirmative action. Part fI examines the tiers of
review, the Supreme Court's traditional tools in this area, and then focuses on
Richmond and Metro to show the Court's inability to reach a stable consensus
in this area. Part m examines several features of judicial decisionmaking to
suggest that doctrinal coherency in general is elusive. It then studies Richmond
and Metro, concluding that they reveal two of the Court's techniques for
obscuring its inevitable incoherence, the false majority and the overgeneralized
conclusion. Part IV suggests possible methods of reducing incoherence. It
concludes, however, that the fundamental disagreements about affirmative
action would prevent any of those methods from achieving its purposes, and
takes solace in the fact that incoherence has its advantages.
I. INCONSISTENT VIEWS OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND AFFIRMATiVE
ACTION
A. Equality Theory
If scholars and judges could agree on a single theory of equal protection,
that theory might serve as the basis for resolution of the debate over the
constitutionality of affirmative action. But no theory has found sufficiently
widespread acceptance. The Fourteenth Amendment was plainly intended to
prohibit the so-called Black Codes-laws that denied recently freed slaves and
other African Americans the same rights granted to the dominant white
majority.8 This specific intent of the Reconstruction Congress, however, is of
8 Numerous articles address the history of the Fourteenth Amendment or its relevance
to contemporary issues. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Affimative Action and the Constitution: Three
Theones, 72 IOWA L. REv. 281, 282 (1987) (explaining that affirmative action was not
anticipated by framers, so it is not unconstitutional, and comparable laws were enacted);
Robert M. Cover, The Ongins of Judicwl Activsm in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1295 (1982) (arguing that the original understanding was that the Fourteenth
Amendment would provide special protection to African Americans); Michael Klarman, An
Interpretive History of Modem Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 228 (1991)
(critiquing reliance on original intent); Michael I. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1025-26 (1979) (stating that
interpreters should begin analysis with the original understanding); Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L.
REV. 753, 754-85 (1985) (analyzing Reconstruction legislation that provided benefits for
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relatively little assistance in gauging the constitutional validity of modem laws
dealing with matters other than race or with affirmative action programs that
give African Americans or members of other minority groups advantages over
members of the still dominant white majority. Perhaps the closest scholars have
come to agreement is the notion that the clause requires that "similar persons
be treated in a similar fashion." 9 This adds little to our understanding; in
effect, it merely shifts the conundrum from the meaning of "equal" to the
African Americans); Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discnmrnation, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 828, 831-34 (1983) (emphasizing Black Codes); Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicaal
Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distntr, and Deconstruction, 73
GEo. L.. 89, 92-93 (1984) (stating that framers were color-conscious, but could not
contemplate present programs); Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Cass Legislation, and
Sex Discnnunation: One Small Cheerfor Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1366, 1367-70 (1990) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FoURT NTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DocrRINE) (noting the "complex,
multi-faceted" history of the amendment, the variety of its sources, and early indications of
its meaning)..
Federal civil rights statutes enacted in the Reconstruction era often provided specific
benefits to former slaves, thereby indicating that absolute colorblindness was not intended
by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, serious problems pervade
attempts to bootstrap this fact into an uncritical acceptance of laws benefiting minorities on a
group basis. First, the Reconstruction legislation was far more clearly remedial than are
most modem programs. Most African Americans of the period had recently been slaves and
all were subject to official mandatory discrimination under the laws of most states. Second,
this history provides no support at all for programs that benefit groups other than African
Americans, yet the Court relatively early recognized its application to other racial groups.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Third, while the experiences of women and
various other racial and ethnic groups have parallels to the history of African Americans, it
demeans the unique nature of African-American slavery to generalize the experience of all
disadvantaged groups. Most importantly, however, the problem with attempting to rely on
original intent theory to justify affirmative action plans is that it is impossible to separate any
intention to allow beneficial legislation from other intentions-such as the intention to permit
continued segregation in public education and other public accommodations. As a nation we
have relied on the general language of the Equal Protection Clause and far broader
principles than those of the Reconstruction Congresses to define the constitutional
guarantee.
9 Laurence Tribe describes one aspect of the equal protection guarantee by noting,
"equality can be denied when government classifies so as to distinguish, in its rules or
programs, between persons who should be regarded as similarly situated in terms of the
relevant equal protection principles." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEmCAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1438 (2d ed. 1988). See also Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987Affinnative Action
Cases: It's All Over But the Shouing, 86 MICH. L. REv 524, 552 (1987) (describing
affirmative action in "similarly situated" terms).
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meaning of "similar."' 0
One response is to treat the equal protection guarantee as meaningless in
the abstract. In the seminal work to this effect, The Empty Idea of Equality,11
Peter Westen argues that assertions of equality ultimately collapse into
assertions of other rights. 12 Equality itself is empty, Westen insists, because
without governing definitions of those other rights, it is impossible to
determine which persons are similar or how society should treat them. 13 This
leads to several discouraging conclusions: equality as a legal concept is
confusing; the rhetoric of equal protection obstructs analysis because it
presupposes the critical inquiry-the determination of "smilarity;" and it
obscures differences among the underlying rights by subjecting all of them to
one form of analysis. 14
A variety of responses to Westen's ideas have enriched the debate by
pointing out that other constitutional terms are as empty as "equality,"' 5 and
10 Tribe acknowledges this in his description of the second aspect of equal protection:
"equality can be deied when government fails to classify, with the result that its rules or
programs do not distinguish between persons who, for equal protection purposes, should be
regarded as differently situated." TRMNE, supra note 9, at 1438. The two aspects express
only a general notion of equitable treatment, with the presence or absence of "similarity"
disputable m actual cases. See Neal Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44 VAND. L. REv.
15, 19-20 (1991) (characterizing affirmative action analysis as hindered by the.need to
distinguish between likes and unlikes); Michael 1. Perry, 7he Pnnciple of Equal Protection,
32 HASTINGS L.. 1133, 1134 (1981) (describing the "similarly situated" concept as empty);
Peter Westen, The Meamng of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81
MICH. L. REV. 604, 611 (1983) (equality requires that treatment be "identical in all
significant descriptive respects"; the key factor is understanding what is significant)
(emphasis added).
I Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. RaV. 537 (1982).
12 Id. at 542. See id. at 547-60 (analyzing various equality theories and arguing that
they represent aspects of other rights); see also DOUGLAs RAE, EQUALrrIEs 3 (1981)
(agreeing that any simple notion of equality is formally empty); Perry, supra note 10, at
1134-35 (supporting the emptiness notion with respect to fundamental rights branch of
equal protection doctrine); Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity:
A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1690 (1986) (agreeing that equal
protection is derivative of other rights to the extent it is a right not to be classified
dissimilarly).
13 Westen, supra note 11, at 547; see also supra note 10.
14 Westen, supra note 10, at 604, 652 (recognizing that "equality" is confusing,
largely because people presuppose similarity in their rhetoric); Westen, supra note 11, at
586 (criticizing judicial use of standards of review); see also infra notes 44-53 and
accompanying text.
15 See Steven J. Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas". Logical Positivist Analyses of
Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136, 1148 (1982) (reasonableness and other terms are
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that the main target of the equal protection guarantee is arbitrariness rather than
the denial of any specific entitlement.' 6 A detailed summary of the "emptiness"
debate is beyond the scope of this Article, but the controversy has given rise to
two opposing notions of the nature of equal protection. One view is simply that
Westen is wrong-that equality itself has a moral value and substantive
content. 17 The other embraces Westen's views and treats the Equal Protection
Clause as a vehicle for incorporating extra-constitutional values into
enforceable constitutional rights. 18 The view that identifies equality as an
independent value tends to favor governmental neutrality, while the view that
sees equal protection as implementing other rights tends to favor specific
entitlements intended to achieve equality. 19 The persistence of these views
equally empty). The Constitution is full of terms potentially as empty as "equality."
16 Anthony D'Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REv 600, 601
(1983) (im some settings, the only legitimate complaint is the lack of equality represented by
an arbitrary classification); cf. Cass R. Sunstem, Public Values, Private Interests, and the
Equal Protection Cause, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 128 (the purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause is "to prohibit unprincipled distributions of resources and opportunities").17 Erwm Chemermsky argues that equality is morally, analytically, and rhetorically
central to constitutional values. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to
Professor Westen, 81 MicH. L. Rnv. 575, 585-91 (1983). Various other theories or
applications of theory identify core moral components of constitutional equality. $ee infra
note 19 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (1977) (arguing
for a right against government to equal concern and respect); TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1514
("The central concept of the clause, equality, requires the specification of substantive values
before it has full meaning"); Sherry, supra note 8, at 98 (discussing the "substance model"
of equal protection, which emphasizes extraconstitutional values such as equality of respect
and conditions). It is indicative of the slippery nature of equality theory that adherents of
one view can reach the same conclusion as their theoretical adversaries. Thus, a believer in
equality having inherent value can argue that affirmative action serves equality, while other
supporters of affirmative action can argue that the! need to import societal values to give
equality meaning justifies special treatment for minorities.
19 Neither view provides a satisfactory approach for applying the Equal Protection
Clause in all settings. The extreme "equality as a value" approach might well require
absolute equality; all legislative classifications would be invalid. This is unthinkable.
All laws, all statutes, contain classifications. That is, they treat people or behavior
differently or the same according to the characteristics the legislature deems relevant.
But which things are the same and wich are different is rarely-in human affairs
never-a question of fact. Rather, it is always a question of perception, and perception
is formed by a wide variety of factors.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPrNG OF AMERICA 65 (1990). It also places too much value on
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one land of equality. The ramifications are sobering. A progressive income tax would
probably be unconstitutional; the government would be required to assess all persons the
same amount (not even the same percentage) to conduct its business. Some governmental
services do work roughly this way. Public schools are open to all children, with no tuition
required even from the wealthy. Similarly, national services such as lawmaking and defense
are provided to all, as are local government's analogues of road maintenance and
emergency services. At least at the national level, of course, such equal services are
supported by a tax system that places greater absolute burdens on those who are wealthy.
The existence of some governmental activity following this approach should not be taken to
mean that it can provide a model for governmental services m general, let alone a
constitutional requirement. By and large, these categories exist because there is no feasible
or prudent method of limiting the class of recipients. The "lawmaking/defense" category fits
only because such services are by definition provided to the entire public. The public
education category works only to a limited extent, as children in wealthy communities
somehow seem to receive a "more equal" education in important respects.
Another extreme view of equality has its roots in the second aspect of Professor Tribe's
description of equal protection. See supra notes 9 & 10. Various descriptions of the positive
aspects of equality focus on an entitlement to specific equal results. E.g., C. Edwin Baker,
Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131
U. PA. L. REV 933, 934 (1983) (describing the right to egalitarian outcomes); Ronald M.
Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6
J.L. & EDUC. 3, 10-11 (1977) (right to treatment as an equal); cf. Michel Rosenfeld,
Affimative Action, Justice, and Equalities: A Philosophical and Constitutional Apprausal, 46
OHIO ST. L.. 845, 854 (198) (noting Dworkin's views and their limited success in the
fundamental rights area). In effect, this view holds that disadvantaged persons have an
entitlement to services or benefits to make up for the disadvantage. Baker, supra, at 939
(citing Rawls's concept of equal distribution of goods); Klarman, supra note 8, at 265-69,
285-86 (distinguishing the Warren from the Burger and Rehnquist courts on this approach
to equal protection); Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemua of Difference:
Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. pt. 2, 157, 159-69 (1985)
(asserting that society must recognize differences to avoid a "faulty" neutrality that advances
the dominant group).
This model mandates equality of result. As with the "absolute neutrality" version of
equality, some government policies seem to follow this approach. Welfare and other
redistribution programs certainly seek to bring about greater equality of result, as does even
the largely ungraduated federal tax system. Nevertheless, such drastic restructuring of our
system cannot realistically be attributed to the Equal Protection Clause; such actions are
almost inevitably the result of policy choices.
In constitutional areas, the limited scope of this version of equality is self-evident. For
example, in the criminal legal services area, Congress and the states have responded to the
mandate of Gideon v. Wainwnght, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), by providing public defender
offices or attorney's fees to private counsel. This results in two systemic inequalities. First,
appointed attorneys are often less able than the best private criminal lawyers. Thus, those
receiving appointed counsel receive adequate-but not truly equal-representation. Second,
many who do not qualify for appointed counsel still cannot afford attorneys who are as
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means that the debate over the constitutionality of affirmative action cannot be
resolved simply through reliance on equality theory.
B. Eight Affinnatve Action Issues
A second obstacle to easy resolution of affirmative action issues is that the
controversy itself tends to splinter into a variety of more specific issues. These
issues, while to a great extent interdependent, create the potential for numerous
approaches to equal protection analysis of affirmative action. Eight of these
issues have been raised frequently in recent attempts to address affirmative
action problems.
1. Class or Classificatuon Analysis
There is substantial disagreement over whether equal protection analysis
should emphasize the government's classification or the class of persons
claiming unequal treatment. This distinction is far more significant than it may
appear. If the government's classification-race or sex or age, for example-is
the key element in determining the application of the Equal Protection Clause,
then all persons classified-whether "majority" or "mmority"-should receive
the same level of judicial protection. As shown below, race is the paradigmatic
setting for strict judicial oversight, 20 thus all laws that classify by race would
be disfavored regardless of whether they benefit or disadvantage minorities. If,
on the other hand, the class disadvantaged by the governmental action is the
critical factor, laws that disadvantage minority groups should still face judicial
hostility because there is reason to suspect the motives of the lawmakers, but
laws favoring such groups are more likely to be upheld because there is less
skilled or experienced as those is most public defender offices. At bottom, equal protection
in the criminal defense area is not really equal protection at all. It is more realistically
characterized as a minimum standard of fairness pursuant to the due process clauses, which
fits the notion of equal protection as itself empty and merely a vehicle for implementing
other substantive values. In the absence of pure socialism, there will always be some who
are unable to afford things that others possess as a matter of course. While it might be a
good thing to provide everyone with sufficient resources to purchase all desired goods and
services, the Constitution does not enact Karl Marx's DAs KAPrrAL any more than it enacts
Herbert Spencer's SOCIAL STATICS. See also Baker, supra at 944 (nor Nozick and Rawls);
Hans A. Linde, 77e Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 253 (1976) (making
a similar point concerning the rational basis test).
There are simply too many worthwhile discussions of various aspects of equality to list.
An interesting starting point is DOUGLAS RAE, EQUALITmES (1981), which points out the
inconsistencies in most operating theories.
20 See infra notes 46 and 69-71 and accompanying text.
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reason for suspicion.21
2. Symmetry
Another issue that arises in affirmative action analysis concerns symmetry.
Governmental action disadvantageous to minority groups is strongly disfavored
under all views. Those who believe that the Equal Protection Clause is
necessarily symmetrical in operation argue that governmental action
disadvantageous to majority groups is necessarily subject to the same
disapproval. 22 Affirmative action is likely to run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause under this view A different notion, based on an antisubjugation
principle, however, denies that symmetry is required. 23 This view redefines the
core of the equal protection guarantee as a prohibition of the evils of racial
inequality. Drawing on history, societal realities, and symbolism, proponents
of this view identify racial antagonism, indifference to persons of other races,
paternalism based on beliefs of inferiority, and stigma as such evils.2 4
21 The classification/class msue often arises m conjunction with deference issues
relating to interpretation of footnote four of Carolene Products v. United States, 304 U.S.
144, 153 (1938). See znfra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
22 In this view, the Equal Protection Clause applies to every individual, therefore it
operates m the same manner with respect to all persons. The surface attractiveness of this
notion is somewhat marred because the very existence of legislative classifications renders
the syllogism maccurate. Nevertheless, it is consistent with our society's ethos to state,
along with former Reagan Justice Department official William Bradford Reynolds, that
"distinctions on the basis of race have no place in a just and rational society." William B.
Reynolds, An Equal Protection Scorecard, 21 GA. L. REV 1007, 1007 (1987). The location
or timing of that symmetry, however, is debatable. Although he is an opponent of
affirmative action, Shelby Steele has stated: "In theory, affirmative action certainly has all
the moral symmetry that fairness requires." Steele, supra note 3, at 23.
Another type of symmetry is found in laws that are neutral on their face but are
motivated by racism or have the effect of racial classifications. For example, m Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), Jackson, Mississippi, closed its muicipal swimming pools
rather than integrate them. The Supreme Court upheld the action, largely because the
decision treated blacks and whites identically, that is, it denied all persons access to public
swimming pools. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225; see TRiBE, supra note 9, at 1480-82. To strong
believers in the symmetry principle, it can be both a necessary and sufficient condition of
equal protection.
23 It does, however, accept symmetry on a high level. As with other theories
sympathetic to affirmative action, it permits nonsymmetrical methods m order to achieve a
symmetrical end.
-
2 4 Professor Tribe states that the antisubjugation principle "aims to break down legally
created or legally reinforced systems of subordination that treat some people as second-class
citizens." TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1515; see also Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1336 (describing
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Affirmative action plans that do not manifest these characteristics do not violate
the Equal Protection Clause under this view.25
3. ForwardBackward
Another controversy concerns the purpose of the government action under
review. Remedial programs are "backward" because they constitute attempts to
remedy past injustices. Programs designed to change future patterns or, more
inspirationally, to improve the nature of society, are "forward." 26 Even those
most opposed to affirmative action on philosophical grounds accept the
propriety of remedying specific injuries, though they are usually careful to
deny that such remedies in fact constitute affirmative action.27 Others take a
modem racial discrimination law as based on a prohibition of racial subjugation).
Terminology can be confusing in tins area. "Antidiscrimination" is arguably the better term,
for it connotes the negative attributes of the unacceptable classification without limiting it to
subjugation, winch is only one form of invidious action. Paul Brest seemed to have tins
notion in mind in his article, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreward In Defense of the
Antidiscnridnation Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976). There he identified the "heart" of
the equal protection guarantee as the prohibition of actions to disadvantage minority groups,
id. at 2, and argued that benign classifications such as affirmative action should be
prohibited only to the extent they reveal such aspects as racial bias, indifference,
stereotypes, or stigma, id. at 21. Nevertheless, Brest's terminology has been used to
describe the symmetrical theory that all racial classifications are equally suspect. E.g.,
Devins, supra note 10, at 27; Rosenfeld, supra note 19, at 878. Accordingly,
antisubjugation more precisely describes tins theory that seeks to distinguish benign from
malign discrimination.
25 Opponents of affirmative action disagree with the antisubjugation prnciple on
theoretical grounds. See generally znfra Part I.B.5-6. They also distrust the principle on
pragmatic grounds, believing it to be too readily manipulable by willful judges or other
interested parties. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 24, at 21 (describing criticisms of Ins anti-
discrumnation prnciple); Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts
of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 126 (1990) (describing the attempt to identify benign
discrimination as "a subjective watching brief').
26 Perhaps the most accurate restatement of tis controversy is to distinguish between
remedial and all other permissible purposes. Remedies, whether in the form of affirmative
action or not, are backward in the sense that they attempt to undo past wrongs. All laws that
classify, whether or not they are remedial, must at least satisfy the mmunum rationality
requirements generally applicable under the Equal Protection Clause. This requires a
legitimate public purpose, some version of the public welfare. See generally TRIBE, supra
note 9, at 1440. Professor Sunstein, a supporter of forward-looking remedies, notes that
courts should require that laws in fact serve legitimate public values if they are to make the
equal protection guarantee work in all settings. Sunstem, supra note 16, at 129-31.
27 This notion is central to Justice Scalia's concurring opinion m Richmond, 488 U.S.
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more generous view of affirmative action, but still. insist that only backward-
looking objectives such as class-based remedies are permissible. Still others
accept forward-looking objectives, asserting that it is the job of legislatures to
try to improve society in the future.28
4. Guilt
Discussion of racist guilt permeates affirmative action analysis. Although
no participant in the debate disputes our nation's history of pervasive
intentional racism or the harm that it has inflicted on African Americans,
substantial disagreement exists concerning racism's present (and future)
effects. 29 Some see racism as largely a phenomenon of the past; under this
469, 520-28 (1989). See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text; see also Neal Devins,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requtem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REv. 125, 142
(1990) (arguing that racial classifications should be limited to remedies); see also Michel
Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meamng of
Constitutional.Equality, 87 MICH, L. REV. 1729, 1748 (1989) (discussing the Scalia view).
It is somewhat curious that opponents of affirmative action seize on the purpose of the
program as a reason for disapproval. Notwithstanding Sunstem's arguments, courts
traditionally have been exceptionally uninterested m examining the purposes of
classifications in other settings, usually accepting the most general assertions of the public
welfare. See TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1440. One ramification is that the objectives of
affirmative action programs are more closely scrutinized than are those of most other
classifications.
For an excellent example of a criticism of forward-looking objectives m the affirmative
action area, see Richard A. Posner, The DeFums Case and the Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 15-18 (describing the
goal as proportional representation and characterizing it as dangerous).
28 See Brest, supra note 8, at 281 (describing the general objective of affirmative
action as "to remedy the problem of a perpetual racial underclass in the United States");
Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritanan Device: Or, Do You Really Want to
Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. Rnv. 1222, 1223 (1991) (arguing that the strongest
justifications for affirmative action are instrumental and forward-looking); John Hart Ely,
The onstitutionality ofReverse Racial Discnnunation, 41 U. CI. L. Rnv. 723, 723 (1974)
("If we are to have even a chance of curing our society of the sickness of racism, we will
need a lot more Black professionals."); cf. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1537-39 (criticizmng the
Court's emphasis on remedial justifications).
The attitude of the decisionmaker on this question is critical. If he or she deems the
objective impermssible, the program violates the Equal Protection Clause even under
deferential review. Conversely, if a program is well-attuned to improve future conditions,
someone who accepts forward-looking objectives is likely to find it to be constitutional. This
may be the real one-sentence synthesis of Richmond and Metro. See generally Part ]I.C.2 9 See, e.g., David Chang, Discrrmanatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent
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view, present-day members of majority groups are-innocent of racism and are
therefore denied equal protection when they are subject to any disadvantageous
treatment due to race.30 Others disagree, citing one (or both) of two reasons.
First, the advantages of past racial preferences did not vanish completely at
some point in the past. Disparities in wealth, education, social class, and
societal expectations tend to live on, with the result that it is likely that many
persons today enjoy the advantages of racism without being racist themselves.31
Second, it is unrealistic in any event to assume that racism is nonexistent today.
The extent of unconscious racism in the legal sphere, for example, is
Victims: Judicial Conservativism or Conservative Justices, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 790, 792 n.8
(1991) (general discussion of controversy); Jesse H. Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to
the Constitutionality of Remedial Racial C7assifications: Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle,
72 IOWA L. RErv. 255, 255 (1987) (identifying major disagreement on this point on the
Court); Devins, supra note 10, at 15 (describing opposing views on innocence and guilt).
Kathleen M. Sullivan criticizes the Court's emphasis on guilt, which she describes as "a
doctrine of sm doomed to partial success-a doctrine m search of perpetrators but not of
victims, and .open still to cries of white innocence." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of
Discnrmnation: Last Tenn's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 78, 95 (1987).30 Then-Professor Scalia addressed the problem at length in The Disease as Cure,
supra note 3, at 152-54, noting that many whites are not only innocent of racism, but were
also harmed by ethmc discrimination, yet are once again in a disadvantaged class. ,See also
Brest, supra note 24, at 92-93 (recognizing that affirmative action unposes burdens on
persons often no better off than the preferred class); Burt Neuborne, Notes for the
Restatement (First) of the Law of Affirmative Action: An Esay in Honor of Judge John
Minor Wisdom, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1543, 1549, 1551 (1990) (describing the burden on
innocent persons as "morally troublesome" and suggesting a need to weigh such burdens in
reviewing affirmative action plans); cf Note, The Supreme Court, 1988 Tenn, 103 HARv.
L. Ray. 40, 225 (1989) (noting that the Court no longer treats racism as part of the setting,
which thereby changes the factual context of the cases before it).
31 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 24, at 31-35 (describing present tangible and intangible
mjunes from past racism); Drew S. Days, MIT, Concealing Our Meaning from Ourselves:
The Forgotten History of Discnnnation, 1979 WAsH. U. L.Q. 81, 82-85 (describing long
and sad history of racism and erroneous assumption it is undone); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Permissive Affinnative Action for the Benefit of Blacks, 1987 U. ILL. L. Ray. 379, 381
(noting the transgenerational effects of social and financial status); Rosenfeld, supra note 27,
at 1782 (noting that long-term pervasive racism necessarily deprives people of equal
opportunities); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REv. 297,
310-16 (1990) (describing innocence rhetoric, but noting pervasive racism and lasting
effects through constructs such as racial stereotypes); Schnapper, Perpetuation, supra note
8, at 830, 835 (identifying present harms from past discrimination); gf. Cass R. Sunstem,
7hree Civii Rights Fallacies, 79 CALiu. L. Ry 751, 764 n.42 (1991) (noting the
conundrum of "innocence," in which whites or men who were not responsible for
discrimination have benefited from it).
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unknowable.32 As a result, the precise role of racism as a factor in equal
protection analysis is necessarily ambiguous. 33 But the persistence of either
racism or its effects militates m favor of affirmative action plans.
5. Injury
Injury is the other side of guilt. Again, while virtually all participants in
the affirmative action debate agree on the existence of past injuries, the nature
and extent of present injuries are more controversial. 34 For example, if
32 Professor Charles R. Lawrence argues that racism affects all persons m ways they
cannot understand, which necessarily prevents courts from accurately weighing the
existence or nature of racism or innocence. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckomng iqth Unconscous Raasm, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321-22
(1987). The article goes on to discuss some of the evidence of unrecognized racism. Id. at
339-42, 349-55; see also Ross, supra note 31, at 314-16 (analyzing unconscious racial
stereotypes).
33 If we cannot agree on the extent to which past racism has created present
advantages, we cannot agree on the utility of forward or backward-looking affirmative
action. Tins wild card is doubly pernicious, for it affects other points ofthe dispute as well.
Symmetry provides a good example. To a believer in white innocence, symmetry probably
requires race-neutral governmental action. To a believer in the continuing effects of racism
(let alone a believer in continuing racism itself), true symmetry probably requires some
form of affirmative action to equalize conditions for the future.
Moreover, the problem does not reduce itself to simple guilt versus innocence. As
David Chang suggests, whites and blacks deprived of job opportunities are both innocent
victims. Chang, supra note 29, at 791. However, a number of commentators argue that
harming innocent persons may be an acceptable price for an effective affirmative action
program. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1336 (describing such harm as an "incidental
consequence" of appropriate programs); Neuborne, supra note 30, at 1551 (stating that the
likelihood of such injuries mandates careful weighing); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 574-75
(noting that such mjunes are tolerated in other areas as well).
34 The arguments suggested in note 31 about the continuing effects of racism relate to
the present injury to be remedied by affirmative action. E.g., Schnapper, Perpetua'on,
supra note 8, at 830 (noting existence of present harms caused by past intentional
discrimination); id. at 844 (using example of literacy test where blacks were previously
denied education). To the extent that the controversy relates to the fact that some benefits
presumably are given to persons who have been relatively fortunate, resolution largely turns
on overinclusive/underinclusive analysis. The remedy is overinclusive, which is logically
analogous to an undernclusive burden. Underinclusiveness is rarely a reason for judicial
invalidation of a classification. See TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1447 n.4. Thus, if affirmative
action programs are subject to heightened scrutiny because of overnclusiveness, it is
another example of judicial hostility to such programs reflected in the stringency ofjudicial
review. See generally it. at 1446-50 (discussing of under and over inclusiveness).
Once again, Justice Scala provides the strongest antiaffirmative action argument,
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suffering an actual, direct injury is a precondition to- receiving benefits under an
affirmative action plan, the plan must be drafted with exceptional specificity to
be certain that the plan operates only to remedy such injuries. The opposing
view, that the lingering effects of racism constitute a general injury to all
members of minority groups, provides support for more aggressive
programs. 35
6. Symbolism
If the previous three controversies seem to relate to pragmatic concerns,
the remaming three are more philosophical m nature. Proponents of affirmative
action note the symbolic value of increased minority participation in businesses
(or other entities or activities) and in positions of respect or authority.36
stressing the unfairness of giving preferential admission to a son of a wealthy African
American over a son of a recent refugee from Europe. Scalia, supra note 3, at 154. The
wealthy black is, under this view, uninjured by racism, and the preferential treatment
aggravates societal discrimination by exacerbating the hardship suffered by the white. See
Fried, supra note 25, at 111 (describing Scalia's approach as premised, on "a logic that is
perhaps more rigorous than practical"); see also Brest, supra note 24, at 48-51 (noting the
problems of group remedies and suggesting that most injures are individual and should be
remedied as such); Rex E. Lee, Missng Pieces: A Comntary on Choper, 72 IowA L.
REV. 275, 277-78 (1987) (describing the victim-specific problem as one of the issues
requiring judicial resolution).
35 There would seem to be two tracks here. The first is the notion of pervasive general
injuries to all African Americans, even the wealthy college student Justice Scalia believes
has suffered no injury. See supra note 34. Most commentators acknowledge such mjunes.
See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 31, at 389 (describing the adverse consequences of being an
African American); Lawrence, supra note 32, at 321 (noting that racism affects all persons);
see also note 31 (additional statements). The second track simply recognizes the pervasive
influence of race and the need to restructure society, as either a forward-looking objective
or as a remedy for past injuries. See supra Part Il.B.3; see also T. Alexander Alemikoff, A
Case for Race-Consczousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1064-69 (1991) (arguing for
benign race-conscious lawmaking outside of remedial contexts). Shelby Steele is typically
iconoclastic on this issue, noting that the injuries from racism are pervasive and subtle but
opposing affirmative action, m part because he believes such injuries cannot be remedied by
existing programs. Steele, supra note 3, at 73-75.
36 See Chemermsky, supra note 17, at 590 (describing equality as a symbol with
"tremendous emotive force"). Symbolism is not merely an emotional factor; at least m
certain circumstances, it can be translated into the more utilitarian "role model" concept.
See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 28, at 1226-30 (discussing the role model concept as
instrumental and forward-looking, but at bottom for the benefit of the majority). Iromcally
Justice Scalia is an evocative witness for the symbolic value of the successful "outsider." At
his confirmation hearing, Justice Scalia agreed that it was a "good thing" to have an Italian
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Symbolism plays other roles as well. If stigma-itself a kind of symbol-is
critical to determining whether a government program violates equal
protection, then symmetry and classification analysis both would seem to be
beside the point. Racial discrimination that stigmatizes would be
unconstitutional, but racial discrmunation that bears no symbolic badge of
inferiority would probably be constitutional. 37 The symbolism of affirmative
action can be turned around, however, and used by its opponents. They
castigate affirmative action as "tokenism" and demean utilitarian justifications
as trivial, or invoke the aid of another symbol to insist that the constitution is
color-blind. 38 Here the ambiguities of the Equal Protection Clause are
transformed into political philosophy by linking the word "equal" to notions of
"blind justice" and absolute fairness.
7. Individualism
A related aspect of the debate concerns the nature of individualism.
American on the Court. Scalia Nomination Hearing, Senate Hearing 99-1064, Serial No. J-
99-119. Again, President Bush's nomination of Justice Thomas certainly suggests that
political conservatives philosophically opposed to affirmative action recogmze this symbolic
value.
37 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 24, at 16-17 (discussing the absence of stigma as
evidence of the bemgn nature of discrimination). Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), is arguably consistent with this notion. Although the Court purported to
disallow all racial segregation in public schooling, 347 U.S. at 493, its emphasis on the
stigmatic effects on black children, 347 U.S. at 493-94 & nn.10, 11, suggests that different
analysis might apply where such effects do not exist. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 32, at 355
(arguing that the presence of stigma is evidence of an invidious racial classification, even if
it appears to be neutral or otherwise symmetrical).
Of course, affirmative action is potentially stigmatic. The existence of affirnative
action can become an excuse for dismissing the accomplishments of minority group
members. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 3, at 154 55. There is something inappropriate,
however, about placing much weight on this concern except when it is raised by a person
subject to the alleged stigma.
38 The color-blind metaphor was first used by Justice Harlan m Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It has long since made its way into
affirmative action caselaw and scholarship. See Fullilove v. Klutzmck, 448 U.S. 448, 523
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); RONALD DWORIUN, LAw's EMPIE 185 (1986) (equal
protection decisionmaking should begin with the strict egalitarian ideal); Brest, supra note 8,
at 284 (describing the color-blind notion as extra-constitutional, rooted "in our culture,
traditions and psychology"); Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1334-35 (finding the metaphor
attractive in "symmetry and simplicity" but not mandated by the Equal Protection Clause);
Rosenfeld, supra note 27, at 1749 (arguing that all Justices believe ultimately in a color-
blind society).
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Opponents of affirmative action interpret the Equal Protection Clause as
conferring an individual right rather than a group right, and claim that group-
based classifications violate the principle that each "person" shall be treated
equally.39 This fits neatly with the innocence theory, as it underscores the
injustice to the person denied the benefit. Innocence is a less effective argument
without an emphasis on individualism; it is hard to characterize the entire class
of majority persons as both innocent of racism and lacking the benefits of past
racial advantages. At bottom this argument turns on the notion that merit is the
only appropriate criterion for judgment. The argument thus invites proposals
for some form of merit determination as an alternative to affirmative action.40
8. Republicanism/Pluralism
The individualism controversy runs parallel to another philosophical
disagreement, this one over the nature of the political process. Special
treatment for groups is at odds with most contemporary notions of
39 Professor Fried notes that the Supreme Court has almost always followed "a liberal,
individualistic view" of equal protection, consistent with the "umversal terms" of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Fried, supra note 25, at 107. Caselaw generally supports his
point. See, e.g., Umversity of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978)
(quoting from Shelley); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("The rights established
are personal rights"); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914)
(emphasizing that individuals are entitled to equal protection). Although this is "effective
rhetoric," Chang, supra note 29, at 798, it is fairly deceptive, given the extent to which the
law now operates through group classifications, with the approval of the Supreme Court.
Id.; see also supra note 19.
40 In an article focusing on age discrimination, The Pnnciple of Equal Protection,
Professor Perry argues that if the factor determining a classification does not relate to
activities, talents, skills, or needs, it is morally irrelevant and violates the equal protection
guarantee as a result. Supra note 10, at 1137-39. Under this view, such "merits" factors are
the only legitimate decisionmaking considerations. '
It is questionable, however, whether tis is the case in reality or whether we could ever
agree on the application of such a requirement. On one level, we would need to decide if
definitions or perceptions of merit are racially (or otherwise) biased. On a second level,
merit is necessarily contextual. A college's perceptions of needs, for example, star athletes
or wealthy contributors, could give it an arguably morally relevant basis for choosing some
applicants over others who would seem to most outsiders to be more qualified. The
theoretically free market system applicable to employment would seem to be less susceptible
to such wide-ranging merit factors. Still, it is evident that "schools attended" and "personal
life-style" are often deemed relevant to hiring decisions, and reliance on such factors can
obscure conscious or unconscious racism (or other biases). Perhaps the support for merit
determinations is "little more than disappointed nostalgia for a golden age that never really
existed." Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1332.
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republicanism and civic virtue.41 The concept of governmental decisionmakers
acting for the common good despite the demands of special interest groups is a
valued part of our national legend, and it meshes with the classical liberal
insistence on individualized determinations of merit. Pluralistic theories counter
these republican notions, holding that society gains when groups battle for
benefits in the political marketplace. 42 To believers in pluralism, affirmative
action does not differ in kind from any other government program, from tax
deductions on real estate interest to protective tariffs for local industry.
C. The Incoherence of Multiple Issues
The variety of issues underlying the affirmative action debate establish that
there are numerous ways to look at the problem. To be sure, attitudes on some
issues tend to go together. For example, those inclined to see the equal
protection guarantee as symmetrical also tend to see the critical question as the
classification used by the decisionmaker and tend, therefore, to disfavor all
race-conscious laws. Nevertheless, different shadings and emphases result in a
41 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Richmond and Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. Rv.
623, 624 (1989) (distinguishing republicanism, with its emphasis on the political
community, from liberalism, with its individualistic emphasis); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLuM. L REV. 1689, 1689-90 (1984) (charaptenzing
equal protection and other constitutional requirements as designed to ensure that
government act to promote the general public good rather than factional interests); Cynthia
V. Ward, The imits of "Liberal Republicanism." Why Group-Based Remedies and
Republican Gtizenslup Don't Mix, 91 CoLuM. L. REv. 581, 583 (1991) (explaining that
interest group politics is inconsistent with republicanism).
42 A number of commentators imply this view. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstem, Interest
Groups in Amencan Public Law, 38 STAN. L. Ray. 29, 33-34 (1985) (suggesting that two
responses to factions are to accept pluralism as an appropriate "market theory" and to
protect disadvantaged groups m a pluralistic society); Patricia I. Williams, Comment, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Tunes, 104 HARv. L. REV. 525, 528
(1990) (supporting multi-culturalism in broadcasting).
As with the antisubjugation principle, terminology can be deceptive. Professor Ward
calls her version of pluralism "interest group liberalism," which requires a "very self-
focused pursuit of rigid, predetermined interests." Ward, supra note 41, at 589. She
describes such politics as alienating and destructive of the political community. Id. at 597.
Professor Farber, on the other hand, finds some support for affirmative action in republican
theory. It recogmzes, for example, that exclusion causes group and individual injuries, and
that racial minorities feel like outsiders. Farber, supra note 41, at 634-35. Society must
accordingly act aggressively to include such outsiders in all aspects of society. Id. at 635.
Professor Williams points out that our nation's ethos of individualism is pervasive,
unrecognized, Williams supra at 530-31 & n.25, and ultimately false. Id. at 534 ("fashion,
a collective aesthetic, a species of mass behavior wrapped in the discourse of self-interest").
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range of governing attitudes from aggressive support of exceptionally broad
programs based on general ideas of pluralism to flat repudiations of any racially
conscious government action. It is no wonder that in the words of one scholar,
"[t]he constitutionality of affirmative action has been perhaps the most divisive
and difficult question of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence." 43
I. AFFRMATIVE ACTION AT THE SUPREME COURT
Both the academy and the practicing bar have looked to the Supreme Court
for a theory of affirmative action to which most persons can subscribe. The
Court, however, like all other players in the equal protection game, has been
unable to construct a unitary theory of equality that commands broad respect or
even to choose sides on the eight issues discussed above with much
consistency. Worse yet, the Court has done most of its work through the tiers
of judicial review, which have little logical connection to the constitutionality
of affirmative action. This section summarizes the Court's use of the tiers m
equal protection cases and then addresses Richmond and Metro, which together
illustrate the. incoherence of the Court's affirmative action analysis.
A. The Evasive Techniques of Constitutional Analysis
In deciding affirmative action cases, courts might have come to grips with
the meaning of equality and sought to define the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection. Instead, they have developed constitutional doctrines that
operate through the stand-in of standards of judicial review As in some other
areas of constitutional doctrine, this involves means-ends analysis.44 The means
is the deliberate "inequality"-the action that treats some persons differently
from others. The end is the governmental purpose-the supposed justification
for the unequal treatment. In theory, any minor variation in treatment would
constitute an equal protection violation if no justification were presented, and
an enormous variation in treatment would 'comply with equal protection if a
43 Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 381, 389 (1989).
44 Professor Sunstem analyzes the interrelated mean-ends tests of the Equal Protection,
Due Process, Privileges and Immunities, Commerce, Contract, and Just Compensation
Clauses m Naked Preferences and the Contmtution, with particular attention to the
relationship between equal protection and due process. Supra note 41, at 1717-18; see also
Lmde, supra note 19, at 201 (noting the connection between equal protection and due
process); Westen, supra note 11, at 570 (noting the need to show a purpose for a
classification and noting the relation to substantive due process). See generally JOHN E.
NowAK, ELr AL., CoNsTrrurIoNAL LAW 525-43 (3d ed. 1986) (summarizing equal
protection analysis).
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sufficiently convincing justification were presented.45
Means-ends analysis is somewhat less amorphous in fact than in
appearance due to the judicial creation of tiers of review Some classifications
are deemed "suspect"; they violate equal protection unless "necessary to a
compelling purpose." 46 Most other classifications are subject only to a
"rational basis" requirement: they comply with equal protection unless they
have no rational relationship to a legitimate purpose. 47 A middle tier, so-called
intermediate scrutiny, also exists; it requires that a classification have a
substantial relationship to an important governmental purpose.48 The use of the
45 For example, if a state were to require persons whose names begin with letters A to
L to file tax returns on April 15 and those whose names begin with M to Z to file on April
22, and were to provide absolutely no reason for the different treatment, the classification
would be arbitrary and apparently violate equal protection, despite the minimal burden
imposed by the classification. Cf. supra note 16 (identifying arbitrary classifications as a
breach of equal protection). A relatively minor reason, such as administrative convemence,
would probably justify such a classification. On the other hand, the World War IT Japanese
internment case involved exceptional hardships imposed on Japanese Americans, yet the
Court found the national security reasons to be sufficient. Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 218-20 (1944).
46 Suspect classifications include race, Palmore v. Sdoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), and
ethime origin, Koremasu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and (arguably) alienage,
see TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1544-53. One of the major disagreements in this area is.whether
the use of strict scrutiny should be determined by the classification or the class of persons
disadvantaged. See Sherry, supra note 8, at 105-06; see also supra Part I.B.1. For a
general discussion of strict scrutiny, see NOWAK, supra note 44, at 530-31. Strict scrutiny is
also applicable to classifications with respect to fundamental rights. See zd. at 721-88;
TRB E, supra note 9, at 1455-65.
47 Innumerable cases apply the rational basis test. E.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93
(1979) (mandatory retirement); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568
(1979) (exclusion from employment for drug use). Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (business regulation). Sunstem argues that the test is a "trivial
restraint," supra note 41, at 1698, and describes it is a rhetorical construct to mask the
absence of meaningful judicial review, rd. at 1715-16. Klarman suggests, however, that in
the equal protection setting the Court often misuses the test, striking down or criticizing
wrong but not irrational classifications. See Klarman, supra note 8, at 233. This may in
effect be simply another way of describing a different level of scrutiny that often uses the
language of rational basis. See infra note 48. On the rational basis test generally, see TRIBE,
supra note 9, at 1439-43, and NOWAK, supra note 44, at 530.
4 8 In the equal protection area, intermediate scrutiny is most clearly applicable to
gender classifications, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), but it has also been used in
illegitimacy cases, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), and alienage cases, e.g., Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). And as a result of Metro, it has been applied to certain
federal affirmative action programs as well. See infra Part ll.B.2. Three standards of
judicial review would seemingly be enough for everyone to handle, but the Supreme Court
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tiers provides all persons with a minimal degree of protection, consistent with
the umversal language of the Equal Protection Clause, but reserves close
judicial scrutiny for those classifications most likely to be abused.49
The notion of suspect classifications has led some scholars to advocate
greater emphasis on the process of decisionmaking by the legislature (or other
governmental body) that adopted the classification.50 This is because one of the
has given commentators good reason to question the matter. For example, in Gty of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Court mssted that it was
using rational basis scrutiny to review a local zoning regulation that disadvantaged group
homes for the retarded, id. at 446, but plainly scrutinized the classification with greater care
than the test had traditionally prescribed, ud. at 447-50. Tribe discusses Caeburne and other
such examples under the rubric "covertly heightened scrutiny." See TRIBE, supra note 9, at
1443-46; see also Devins, supra note 27, at 148 (noting that the "rational basis" test can in
some settings appear to be more demanding than strict scrutiny). Professor Schwartz adds to
the roster of tests a "less strict scrutiny" applicable to affirmative action. Schwartz, supra
note 9, at 550. Although Richmond was decided after Schwartz's article and purported to
deny the existence of this standard, aspects of the decision suggest that it might be one of
the practical .results. See znfra. notes 140-43 and accompanying text. For a general
discussion of intermediate scrutiny and the somewhat raggedy tier between it and rational
basis, see NOWAK, supra note 44, at 531-43.
4 9 Sunstein argues that heightened scrutiny is appropriate where there is a strong basis
to fear a bad motive by the lawmaker, Sunstem, supra note 16, at 140, but also notes
concerns with lack of political power, Sunstein, supra note 41, at 1700, thereby suggesting
the process concerns addressed m the next paragraph of the text. See also Erwin
Chemermsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Tenn-Foreword: The Vanishing Contitut'on, 103
HARV. L. REv. 44, 73 (1989) (describing "tiered jurisprudence" as encompassing a
presumption in favor of rational basis review, with heightened scrutiny only if some special
reason is identified).
In practice, true rational basis analysis is rarely more than a rubber stamp, see, e.g.,
TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1443, while strict scrutiny almost invariably results in judicial
disapproval, see Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Tenn-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Docinne on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protecion, 86 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (it is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"). In an odd way, this formulaic
application of ends-means analysis comes close to unplementing at least some of the original
premises of the Equal Protection Clause. Official discrimination against racial or ethnic
minorities is the paradigmatic suspect classification; through the virtually unmeetable
requirements of (true) strict scrutiny, the Equal Protection Clause in effect prohibits any
governmental classifications that discriminate against such groups. At least one of the
fiamers' specific intentions-that African Americans not suffer from legal disabilities due to
their race-is therefore satisfied.
50 The major figure in this school is John Hart Ely, who developed a representation-
reinforcing theory of judicial review premised on deference to decisions in which the
political process works as intended, but greater scrutiny of decisions in which the political
process appears to be flawed. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRusT 73-104
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theoretical premises of deferential review is trust in the legislative process. In
his opinion for the Court in United States v. Carolene Products,51 Justice Stone
defended the Court's deferential review of the economic legislation before the
Court on this basis, but went on to suggest that more searching review would
be appropriate for statutes "directed at particular religious ... or national...
or racial minorities." 52 Both his approach and the more traditional use of the
standards of review support careful judicial scrutiny of laws disadvantaging
racial minorities. His approach deviates from the facially symmetrical
standards, however, when government classifies on the basis of race but favors
a minority group. If a decisionmaker disadvantages itself (or a group to which a
majority of the lawmakers belong), there is no reason to distrust the process,
(1980); Ely, supra note 28, at 733-37 (elaborating on problems in the legislative process
and possible judicial responses). As one of the primary flaws of the legislative process is its
failure to weigh properly the interests of outsiders such as racial minorities, this aspect of
process theory works in tandem with the more established premises of strict scrutiny. See
supra notes 46, 49. Various other commentators note the relevance of process theories to
equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 8, at 1304-09 (noting the importance
of the political process and majoritaranism in race issues); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Fnckey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affinnative Action and the Dynanucs of
avil Rights Leguslation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 685, 685-88 (1991) (summarizing aspects of
processes approaches and noting flaws in the underlying political theories); Klarmap, supra
note 8, at 284-85, 309 (noting different political process theories pertinent to equal
protection analysis); Linde, supra note 19, at 222-42 (supporting judicial review of the
legislative process rather than mean-ends analysis). But see Laurence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theones, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064
(1980) (calling Ely's argument "lucid" but disagreeing with the heavy emphasis on process
rather than substantive rights).
51 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
52 Id. at 153 n.4. The footnote also suggested the need for careful review of legislation
appearing to be in violation of a specific constitutional prohibition, legislation restricting the
political processes, or otherwise directed at "discrete and insular minorities." Id.
The rationale for deference to the legilature is that it acts without prejudice; deference
is therefore inappropriate where that assumption is unwarranted. The footnote remains
controversial today. See generally BORK, supra note 19, at 58 (describing theories premised
on the footnote as "pernicious"); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (challenging the premises of minority group weakness in
politics); J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 275, 281 & n.16 (1989) (listing
articles on the footnote and its progeny); Cover, supra note 8, at 1291 ("Footnote four
combined a textual and a functional justification for the differing standards of review.");
Farber & Frickey, supra note 50, pazmn (analyzing the footnote in various respects), id. at
690 -(ascribing to it "much of the ensuing half-century of constitutional law"); Klarman,
supra note 8, at 220 (arguing that the Court has not relied on Carolene Products m equal
protection cases).
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and deferential review would be appropriate. 53
B. The Cases
The Supreme Court has considered numerous cases that concern
affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause.54 Only a shameless
apologist could characterize the opinions in those cases as representing an
evolution of doctrine. After the first handful of decisions, Justice Scalia, then a
professor at the University of Chicago Law School, described the situation as
follows:
Here, as in some other fields of constitutional law, it is increasingly
difficult to pretend to one's students that the decisions of the Supreme Court
53 Decisionmakers are not prejudiced against themselves and presumably would not act
against their own interests without adequate justification. See generally Devins, supra note
10, at 34 (noting distinction between classifications burdenung minorities and classifications
helping minorities); Ely, supra note 28, at 733-41 (there is nothing suspicious when the
majority helps a minority); Sherry, supra note 8, at 105-06 (noting that the Court has
wavered between the Ely approach and a classification-based approach). But see Rosenfeld,
supra note 27, at 1743 (noting that process theories will not provide agreement on
affirmative action issues).
5 4 Five decisions through 1990 addressed the merits of affirmative action under the
Equal Protection Clause. Metro, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), see infra Part ]I.B.2; Richmond, 488
U.S. 469 (1989); Part ]I.B.1; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
(layoffs of public school teachers); Fullilove v. Klutzmck, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (federally
funded public construction contracts); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) (minority admissions quota). Numerous articles address one or more of these
decisions. See, e.g., Robert A. Bohrer, Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove: Bemgn
Discnnunation and Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 IND.
L. 473 (1981) (discussing various cases); Choper, supra note 29, at 256-60, 271-74
(addressing constitutional and statutory cases through 1987, focusing on views of individual
Justices); Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 56 YALE L.J. 453 (1987) (analyzing Fullilove);
Fried, supra note 25 (analyzing Metro, discussing others); Rosenfeld, supra note 27
(analyzing Richmond, discussing others); Ross, supra note 31, at 302-07 (discussing Bakke,
Fullilove, Wygant, Richnond); Schnapper, Affirmative Action, supra note 8, at 789-96
(discussing Bakke and Fullilove); Schwartz, supra note 9 (analyzing ygant and statutory
cases from 1986 and 1987). There are also numerous statutory cases, most involving Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1989), which provide some insight
into the thinking of the Justices on the equality themes. E.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616 (1987) (an affirmative action plan may lawfully result m preference over an
otherwise more qualified person); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
(holding Title VII's prohibition of racial discrimination did not prohibit all private voluntary
racial classifications).
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are tied together by threads of logic and analysis-as-opposed to what seems to
be the fact that the decisions of each of the Justices of the Court are tied
together by threads of social preference and predisposition. 55
This description remains accurate today. The opinions in City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co.56 and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,57 decided only
seventeen months apart by the same nine Justices, reveal inconsistent visions of
the constitutional status of affirmative action.
1. Richmond
In 1983, Richmond, Virginia adopted an ordinance that required
affirmative action in the awarding of city construction contracts.58 The
Minority Business Utilization Plan provided that prime contractors must
subcontract to Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs) at least thirty per cent of
the contract. The affirmative action plan was a "set-aside," modeled in most
respects on a federal statute that the Supreme Court upheld against an equal
protection challenge m Fullilove v. Klutznick.59 As in the federal statute, the
ordinance defined "Minority Group Members" as "[c]itizens . . . who are
Blacks, Spamsh-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." 60 The City
Council enacted the ordinance after a public hearing at which the low level of
minority participation in the construction business was discussed, including
assertions and denials of public and private discrimination. The ordinance had
two interrelated purposes: it was both "remedial" and designed to "promot[e]
wide participation by minority business enterprises m the construction of public
projects." 61 The J.A. Croson Company was a prime contractor on a city
plumbing project that was subject to the affirmative action program. Croson
found it difficult to find an MBE willing to subcontract for what the company
55 Scalia, supra note 3, at 147. Part II.C indicates that, at least m this respect, Justice
Scalia accurately describes affirmative action law.
56 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
57 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
58 The factual description is from Justice O'Connor's opinion. See Richmond, 488
U.S. at 477-86. No Justice appeared to disagree with her on this point, although the context
of the Richmond program was hotly debated. See zd. at 528-35 (Marshall, L, dissenting);
infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. For descriptions of the Richmond program, see
Alemikoff, supra note 35, at 1072-73, and Douglas D. Scherer, Affimative Action Doanne
and the Conflicting Messages of Croson, 38 KAN. L. REV. 281, 309-14 (1990).
59 448 U.S. 448 (1980), upholding section 103(0(2) of the Public Works Employment
Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1989).
60 RICHMOND, VA., CrrYCODE, §12-23 (1985).
61 Id. at § 12-158(a).
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believed was a reasonable price. When the company's request for a waiver of
the set-aside was denied, it challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional. A
majority of the Supreme Court ultimately agreed. 62
In one sense, Richmond constituted an improvement m the Court's
treatment of constitutional affirmative action cases; for the first time,63 parts of
one opinion officially spoke for a majority. Careful reading of the opinions
reveals, however, that this minor level of agreement with Justice O'Connor's
lead opinion was accompanied by substantial disagreement among the Justices.
Roughly half of the O'Connor opinion was supported by a majority; different
pluralities supported other portions; three Justices dissented. In effect, the
Court spoke with eight different voices.64
Although Justice O'Connor's majority/plurality opinion was the strongest
in the sense that it represented the views of the most Justices, it has been
accurately described as "a remarkably tortured piece of work." 65 Indeed, her
62 The district court upheld the plan and was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.
Ridnond, 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
case back to that court for reconsideration under Wygant. Richmond, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).
The Fourth Circuit then invalidated the plan. Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987),
af'd, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
63 In Umversity of Califonua Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), what was m
essence a tie between two four Justice coalitions was broken by Justice Powell'a vote to
invalidate the minority admissions quota but leave room for race-conscious admissions
programs. Id. at 319-20. In Fulliove v. Klutzmck, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court again
essentially broke down into three groups, with three Justices setting the prevailing view by
voting to uphold a racial set-aside. Id. at 453-92. Finally, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), only a plurality could agree on the reason to strike down a
race-based plan to lay off public school teachers. 476 U.S. at 269-84.
64 Richmond is "one of the most complex 'scorecards' of the Justices in hstory." Ross,
supra note 43, at 395. Technically, Part I (facts of case), Richmond, 488 U.S. at 477-86;
Part HI.B (factual premises of Richmond's plan), 7d. at 498-506; and Part IV (means
analysis), id. at 507-11, of Justice O'Connor's opinion were a majority opnion, as they also
represented the views of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy.
Part I (discussion of Fulliove), id. at 486-93, represented the views of Justice O'Connor,
the Chief Justice, and Justice White. Part ItL.A (standard of review), id. at 493-98,
represented the views of the latter three Justices and Justice Kennedy. Justice Stevens issued
an opmion concurring in part, id. at 511-18; Justice Kennedy also issued an opmion
concurring in part, id. at 518-20. Justice Scalia issued an opinon and concurred in the
judgment. Id. at 520-28. Justice Marshall issued a dissent, i. at 528-61, joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun. Justice Blackmun issued a dissent. Id. at 561-62. The eight
different voices are the "three" O'Connor opimons (a majority and two different pluralities),
the three concurrences, and the two dissents.
65 Ross, supra note 43, at 391. Perhaps unnecessarily, given the eight different voices,
Professor Ross goes on to note that it is "impossible to discern a coherent legal structure to
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attempt to maintain a majority may well have rendered the opinion labored and
unclear. The two analytical sections that commanded majority support are fact-
dense and subject to different interpretations, while, oddly, two sections that
did not command a majority may have established the most reliable precedent.
The first plurality portion of the opinion confronted Fullilove, noting that
the earlier decision had stressed Congress's unique power to fashion legislation
to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. This portion concluded that states and
local governments have less leeway than Congress to attack society-wide
discrimination through broad legislation.66 Justice Scalia also purported to
accept the federal/state distinction, but no other Justice appeared to accept it.67
Nevertheless, Metro confirmed the distinction a year later. 68
A second, different, plurality supported Justice O'Connor's conclusion that
strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. This portion of the
opinion asserted that all racial classifications should receive strict scrutiny
because equal protection is an individual right and because only such scrutiny
identifies those governmental actions that are based on racial stereotypes or
prejudice.69 Justice O'Connor briefly addressed the "Carolene Products
argument that strict scrutiny is necessary only to protect minorities, but did so
largely to suggest problems in applying such an approach, noting that the
population of Richmond was almost evenly split by race, and that a majority of
the members of the City Council were African Americans. 70 Although
unwilling to sign even this portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion, .Justice
which a majority of the Court commits." Id. Professor Farber is somewhat lander,
describing the O'Connor opimon as "a deeply republican opinion centering on concerns
about political deliberation and civic community." Farber, supra note 41, at 624.66 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 486-93.
67 Justice Scalia's acceptance of this distinction was grudging, see id. at 521-24,
although he did find theoretical support for it m the notion that racial discrimination is less
likely at the national level than at the state or local level, id. at 523. Justice Stevens did not
mention the distinction in his concurring opinion, id. at 511-18, but he pointedly did not
join this section of Justice O'Connor's opinon. Justice Kennedy described the distinction as
"a difficult proposition for me," id. at 518, but felt the question was not before the Court,
id. The dissenters, of course, demed the distinction, as they voted to uphold the City's
action. See id. at 557-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting breadth of state powers to
remedy discrimination).68 See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
6 9 ichwnd, 488 U.S. at 493-98.
70 Id. at 495-96. The significance of the makeup of the City and its Council was
sharply disputed in dissent. Id. at 553-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Rosenfeld,
supra note 27, at 1773-76 (disputing Justice O'Connor's conclusion that such analysis must
be symmetrical and mandates strict scrutiny in the Richmond setting).
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Scalia fully supported use of strict scrutiny,71 thereby creating in effect a
majority on the standard of review issue.
The first portion of the O'Connor opinion that technically spoke for a
majority concerned whether Richmond had established its compelling interest
in remedying past discrimination in the construction industry.72 Here the Court
emphasized the inadequacy of the record before the City Council.
Characterizing the existence and effects of racial discrimination in terms such
as "sheer speculation," 73 "generalized assertion," 74 and "unsupported
assumption," 75 the Court concluded that no compelling purpose in eradicating
discrimination had been established. 76 While less philosophical here than in
other portions of the opinion, Justice O'Connor did draw on equality theories
to note that affirmative action in settings in which it was not justified would
71 Iis opinion began with stating his agreement on this point, notwithstanding is
unwillingness to join even this part of the O'Connor opinion. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 520.
Justice Scalia's version of strict scrutiny is quite strict; the difference within the Court on the
meaning of strict scrutiny presents one of the difficulties in finding coherence in this area.
See znfra notes 140-46, 259-60 and accompanying text.
72 Although the Richmond plan had forward-looking as well as remedial aspects, see
supra text accompanying note 61, the Court looked at it only as a remedial program. In
large part this was a result of the majority's equation of generalized assertions of past
discrmination with the "role model" justification for racial preferences found insufficient in
Wygant. Ridhmond, 488 U.S. at 498-99 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 276 (1986)). There are two problems with this fairly straightforward discussion. First,
it seems inextricably bound to the federal/state distinction with respect to authority to
remedy societal discrimination, and that distinction did not have majority support. See infra
notes 126-132 and accompanying text. Second, in at least some (arguably distinguishable)
settings, "diversity," a stand-in for "role models," has been found by a majority to be a
permible objective. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 311-15
(1978) (Justice Powell's opinion); see also nfra notes 105-06 and accompanying text
(regarding Metro).
73 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 499.
7 4 Id. at 500.
75 Id. at 502.
76 Id. at 505. Moreover, the Court refused to allow Richmond to "piggyback" on the
congressional findings of racial discrimination in the construction industry, which it had
found sufficient in Fullilove. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 504-05. This must have been
exceptionally frustrating for the City, for it is apparent that the drafters, like any other
capable attorneys, relied on the Court's approval of the findings and program structure in
Fullilove as a good indication of how they should formulate the Richmond plan. Here too,
however, the action by the purported majority seems to depend on the plurality's distinction
between federal and state power, thereby again undercutting the rationale. See id. at 504
(noting Congress's special powers in this area as a reason not to allow the City to use the
Fullilove findings).
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mean that "[t]he dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is
irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of
shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past
wrongs." 77 This section of the opinion ended by criticizing Richmond for
including in the MBE definition groups never shown to be subjects of
discrimination by the City.78 Thus, the Court attacked Richmond's pluralistic
view of policymaking.
Justice O'Connor again spoke for a majority in examining the ordinance
under the "narrowly tailored" component of the strict scrutiny standard. The
thrust of this discussion was that governments must attempt to use race-neutral
devices to remedy past racial discrinimation and that quotas are repugnant to
constitutional equality. An affirmative action program is a "deviation from the
norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups," 79 and is accordingly
limited to the most extreme exigencies.
The concurring and dissenting opinions were more deeply rooted in equal
protection philosophy. Justice Stevens, a noted maverick in constitutional
analysis, 80 agreed that the Richmond ordinance was invalid. Much of his
opinion, however, rested on concerns about the propriety of legislative attempts
to remedy past racial discrimination. 81 He expressed a strong preference for
forward-looking legislation, which is in sharp contrast to the working
7 7 Id. at 505-06.
78 "There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against Spaish-speaking,
Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any aspect of the Richmond construction
industry .... It may well be that Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen." Id.
at 506. Again, it seems somewhat harsh for the Court to be so dismissive, as it is evident
that Richmond acted in the not unreasonable belief that the most appropriate action it could
take would be to duplicate the federal program m all important respects.
7 9 Id. at 510. This last conclusion comes from Part V of the O'Connor opimon, which
was not supported by a majority.
80 See, e.g., ROBERT JUDD SICKELS, JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE CONsTrruTIoN: THE
SEARCH FOR BALANcE ix-x (1988) (describing Justice Stevens as the most pragmatic and
independent member of the modem Court); Fried, supra note 25, at 126 (noting Stevens's
views in affirmative action cases but suggesting they have no discernible pattern);
Comment, The Emerging Consttudional Junspndence of Justice Stevens, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 155, 232 (1978) (noting that Stevens "is often willing to depart sharply from the
courses taken by his fellow Justices and to reformulate judge-made rules of constitutional
law in a manner closer to his perceptions of the fundamental principles of the
Constitution."). As shown below, hIs umque views (on the Court) concerning standard of
review and permissible objectives of affirmative action programs created a false majority in
Metro on some issues. See infra notes 115-17, 131, 136-39, 262-64 and accompanying
text.
81 Ricmond, 488 U.S. at 513-14.
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majority's insistence on backward-looking (or remedial) purposes. He also
parted company with his colleagues by arguing that standard of review analysis
is inappropriate in equal protection cases. Justice Stevens did, however, agree
in part with the others who voted to overturn the ordinance, as he voiced
concerns about race-conscious decislonmnaking that results from reliance on
stereotypes and stigmatizes both the disadvantaged and advantaged classes.82
Justice Scalia's concurrence83 called for the strictest scrutiny of all racial
classifications and revealed hum to have the greatest resistance to affirmative
action programs. His opinion set out the philosophical bases of the "color-
blind" view of equal protection, but added a tinge of utilitarianism:
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as
nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source
of those effects, which is the tendency-fatal to a nation such as ours-to
classify and judge men and women on the basis of their country of origin or
the color of their skm.84
Justice Scalia's description of his version of the Equal Protection Clause
reveals the depth of his commitment to the symmetry notion. He concluded that
race-conscious actions are permitted only to undo, as precisely as possible, past
or present constitutional violations,85 or as a temporary measure in "a social
82 Id. at 514-17. Justice Stevens pointedly ended his opinion with a lengthy extract
from his dissenting opinion in Fullilove, wnch again underscores the difficulty in ascribing
much weight to the Riconond "majority's" distinction of Fullilove. Justice Stevens's
treatment of permissible objectives, Id. at 511-13 & nn.1, 2, and standard of review, 7d. at
514-15 & nn.5, 6, are not shared by any other Justices. See supra note 80 and znfra notes
131, 136-39 and accompanying text.83 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 520-28.
84 Id. at 520.
85 Id. at 524-25. Justice Scalia then pointed out that states have much more power to
act against discrimination when they use methods other than racial classifications. This may
further fray the doctrine resulting from Richmond. If the problem is "means" not "ends,"
then forward-looking programs against general societal discrimination would not seem to be
outside of state authority, as long as they avoid racial classifications. This would seemingly
undercut the denigration of such objectives by essentially the same group of Justices in
dissent in Metro. See znfra note 121 and accompanying text. A further problem suggested
by Justice Scalia's analysis here (and arguably by the majority's preference for alternative
approaches as well) is that neutral legislation with the intention of having a racial effect
would seemingly violate equal protection no less than an overt racial classification. See,
e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) ("A statute, otherwise neutral on its
face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race."); see also
Alemikoff, supra note 35, at 1107 (suggesting that the Court invites mmority-domnmated
cities to evade careful scrutiny through a sham race neutrality); Lively, supra note 3, at 501
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emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb.... "86
While they reveal that he is not an absolutist, his examples of permissible racial
classifications indicate the special status he accords to them. Significantly,
Justice Scalia's opinion concluded with references to the injuries that racial
quotas inflict.8 7
If the Scalia opinion sets the right end of the spectrum, Justice Marshall's
dissent sets the left. The dissent begins with symbolism of its own: "It is a
welcome symbol of racial progress when the former capital of the Confederacy
acts forthrightly to confront the effects of racial discrimination in its midst." 88
After disputing the majority's conclusions concerning the quality and quantity
of evidence before the Richmond City Council, Justice Marshall selected
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for race-conscious
classifications of a remedial nature. 89 He thus plainly rejected the view that
equal protection analysis is necessarily symmetrical.
Focusing first on the "ends" aspect of intermediate scrutiny, the Marshall
opinion notes two sufficient governmental interests: one backward-looking
remedial objective and the other a more forward-ooking interest in preventing
government4l contracting practices "from reinforcing and perpetuating the
exclusionary effects of past discrimination. " 9 The premise of this second point
(noting that Scalia's suggestion "may be vulnerable to the criticism that neutrality merely is
a disguise for race consciousness"); cf. Chang, supra note 29, at 800 ("One might read
Davis as suggesting that certain racially-oriented programs are impermissible per se.");
Devins, supra note 10, at 31 (even "neutral purposes [may] cloak discriminatory motives").
But see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (stating state constitutional provision
applicable to all low-rent housing not treated as racially motivated).
86 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 521. Justice Scalia is therefore not color-blind, despite his
quotation of Justice Harlan m Plessy v. Ferguson. Id. (quoting from Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896)). Advocates of affirmative action, however, would probably
characterize Justice Scalia as color-short-sighted.
87 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 526-28. At this point, Justice Scalia is drawing on the
themes of guilt and innocence to justify his limited view of permissible remedial action. See
supra Part LB.4. Justice Kennedy's concurrence noted his philosophical agreement with
Justice Scalia on racial classifications. Id. at 518-19. He noted, however, that Justice
O'Connor's opimon was acceptable because some flexibility is needed m order to assure
that remedies are adequate, and her approach provided for extremely careful judicial
review. Id. at 519. His lukewarm support therefore weakens the "majority" even further.
88 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 528. Thomas Ross describes the Scalia and Marshall
opimons as the essential stories underlying the controversy. Ross, supra note 43, at
381, 390. While Justice Scalia's opinion is "abstract" and "vivid," id. at 390-91, 400-
04, Justice Marshall's is personal and rich m details, id. at 391, 398, 405-08.
89 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 535-36.
90 Id. at 537. Justice Marshall's discussion of the remedial objective does not acquiesce
in the O'Connor opinion's notion that Fulliove's approval of a general authority to remedy
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is that past racism has present effects-the fact that even assuming the lack of
present-day racism, those who benefited in the past maintain economic
advantages. 91 Justice Marshall then challenged the notion that the proof of past
discrimination was inadequate, relying on the record, congressional findings,
and inferences from indisputable facts. 92 Central to his argument was a
challenge to the majority's apparent insistence on formal findings of fact; both
precedent and the nature of the inquiry mandated a more practical evaluation of
the factual underpinnings of the program.93
Justice Marshall then addressed the "substantially related" prong of
intermediate scrutiny. 94 He emphasized both the similarity of the ordinance to
the federal program upheld in Fullilove and the existence of a number of factors
that lessen the apparent stringency of the thirty percent set-aside. The
implication of his analysis was that the majority exaggerated the effects of the
program to imply that it was so extreme that it would not result in greater
equality, but was instead a new injustice that would aggravate existing
inequalities, if with different victims.
The final section of the Marshall opinion returned to philosophy to
challenge some of the majority's assumptions. Its underlying theme was the
inescapable istory of racism and the need for further remedial action. 95 This
past racial discrimination is limited to the federal government. Id. at 536-37, Part II.C of
Ins opimon challenges this notion directly. Id. at 555-61.
91 Id. at 537-39. This discussion provides legal and logical support to the notion that
government must act to correct societal discrimination. It also points out ways in which the
guilt/innocence dichotomy misses the point of the harmful inpacts of racism. See supra Part
I.B.5, 6. In contrast, the O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy opinons seem to treat racism as
ancient history. See Alemikoff, supra note 35, at 1073-74 (noting the history of racism in
Virgima); Leedes, supra note 3, at 26-30 (discussing the majority's treatment of the
evidence of racism i Richmond); Rosenfeld, supra note 27, at 1761-69 (attributing the
majority's dismissal of racism to the fact that the Justices evaluated facts separate from their
context); Note, supra note 30, at 225 (Richmond reveals that "[tihe Court no longer
assumes a backdrop of racism"); cf. Ross, supra note 43, at 406 (Justices O'Connor and
Scalia see past racism as irrelevant to present law); Williams, supra note 42, at 529-30
(suggesting white Americans do not recognize the dominance of white culture).
92 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 539-48.
93 Id. at 539. The dissenting opinion argued that the federal findings and local
evidence constituted sufficient proof of the nature and extent of discrimination in Richmond
area construction, and noted the statistical significance of the extreme disparity between the
races in city contracting. Id. at 540-43. While in some respects the opinion veers into the
esotenca of proof theory and federalism issues relating to local reliance on federal fact-
finding, the bulk of this discussion constitutes a down-to-earth explanation of the evident
need for governmental action to address racial discrimination in this industry.
9 4 Id. at 548-51.
95 Id. at 552-53. Once again, this discussion reinforces the distinction the dissenters
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theme was underscored by an examination of Richmond politics and an
argument for judicial tolerance of state and local attempts to protect civil
rights. 96 Compared to the majority's description of the facts and governing
law, Justice Marshall's account appears to be a description of a different case
from a different country.
2. Metro
After Richmond, both scholarly and popular journals published articles
suggesting that the decision effectively invalidated affirmative action
programs. 97 Reality intervened on the last day of the Court's next term when it
decided Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.98 In this decision, the Court upheld
two minority preference programs of the Federal Communications
Commission. While the federal/state dichotomy recognized in Richmond
provides a technical, legal distinction between the cases, 99 Metro departed from
Richmond in both philosophy and in governing legal theory
In 1978, the FCC adopted a policy intended to increase diversity in
broadcasting. One feature of the policy was that the Commission would grant a
preference for minority ownership and management in weighing competing
applications for new broadcasting licenses. Another was that minority
businesses would be permitted to purchase the licenses of companies whose
identified between malign and benign discrimination, a distinction that the majority accepted
only to the extent that they agreed sufficient proof of past discrimination provides a
permissible objective for a race-conscious remedy. A malign classification, on the other
hand, would apparently fail strict scrutiny (or even less demanding judicial review) because
it has no permissible objective and would therefore be unconstitutional regardless of its
methods. Cf. supra note 45.
9 6 Richnond, 488 U.S. at 553-55. Justice Blackmun's short dissenting opinion also
stressed the real world of history and politics that mandates affirmative action. Id. at 561-
62.
9 7 See, e.g., Devins, supra note 4, at 358 (noting various responses to Richmond that
conclude that the matter is resolved); Farber, supra note 41, at 624 n.8 (noting responses to
Richmond); Leedes, supra note 3, at 1 (describing Richmond as a "significant turning
point"); Rosenfeld, supra note 27, at 1731 (noting its significance m clarifying the Court's
views); Charles Krauthammer, Exit Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1989, at A25
(analogizing affirmative action after Richmond to Custer after Little Big Horn). One
suspects that someone would have described the matter as "it's all over but the shouting,"
except for the fact that Herman Schwartz published an article under that title in 1987. It too
assumed too much from seemingly clear Supreme Court decisions. See Schwartz, supra
note 9.
98 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
99 See supra notes 66-68 and infra notes 104, 126-32 and accompanying text.
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qualifications were under review. In each instance, of course, the minority
enterprise had to be qualified in order to obtain a license. Under the
comparative hearing preference, however, a minority business might obtain a
license over a nonminority business that scored somewhat higher on other
relevant factors; and only minority businesses were permitted to buy licenses
from owners undergoing review. 10
Both of these programs were challenged in litigation brought by
nonminority applicants that were denied licenses ultimately issued to minority
businesses. After protracted administrative and judicial proceedings, the D.C.
Circuit issued separate decisions upholding the comparative hearing preference
but invalidating the distress sale policy 1o1 These apparently inconsistent results
in two of the first post-Richmond cases in the lower courts evidently piqued the
Supreme Court's interest, and the Court promptly granted review and issued a
single decision upholding both programs.
The majority opinion was Justice Brennan's final opinion for the Court.
Writing for himself and for Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
100 The FCC acted through its Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of
Broadcasting Facilities. In re Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, Policy
Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978). Prior to this action, the FCC primarily considered
diversification of ownerslp and control, whether ownership actively participated m
management, proposed programming, past record in broadcasting (if any), efficiency m
engineering, and character. See West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601,
604-07 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cer. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985). Henceforth, the FCC would
treat minority ownership and management as a plus m weighing these factors to the extent
that the owners participated in management. See WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12
(D.C. Cir. 1978). The portion of the policy relating to the sale of licenses is called the
"distress sale" policy. Under standard FCC rules, a licensee under review by the agency
may not transfer or assign its license. The distress sale policy is an exception that allows
such licensees to sell to qualified businesses with predominantly minority ownership at a
price of less than the market value. See In re Minority Ownership, 68 F.C.C.2d at 983.
101 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. challenged the FCC's reliance on the minority preference
program for new broadcasting licenses to grant a license to a business with nnety per cent
Hispanic ownership. Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 688 (Rev. Bd. 1984). After a
remand for agency reconsideration of all such programs, the D.C. Circuit upheld the
issuance of the license and the preference program, see znfra note 112. Winter Park
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see Metro, 497 U.S. 547,
558-61 (1990).
Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., a broadcasting licensing applicant, challenged
a distress sale of a television station m Hartford, Connecticut, to a minority applicant. Faith
Center, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 1164 (1984). After a remand for the same agency
reconsideration involved in the Metro Broadcasting proceedings, a different panel of the
D.C. Circuit invalidated the distress sale policy. Shurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d
902 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see Metro, 497 U.S. at 561-63.
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Justice Brennan set out a holding plainly receptiveto affirmative action. This
attitude is evident from the outset of the opinion-a clear statement of the
standard of review and the nature of permissible objectives:
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-
even if those measures are not "remedial" m the sense of being designed to
compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrmnnation-are
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve miportant
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially
related to achievement of those objectives. 102
A majority of the Justices thus approved use of intermediate scrutiny and
reliance on forward-looking governmental objectives, both of which were
seemingly disapproved on theoretical and doctrinal grounds the year before in
Richmond.l0 3
The distinction between the two cases, of course, lies in the phrase
"mandated by Congress." The Court recognized different standards for
affirmative action (and necessarily for equal protection) by state and federal
governmental entities. The distinction was not new in Metro, as the Richmond
plurality relied on it to impose strict scrutiny on state and local action without
overruling Fullilove v. Klutznick.1°4 In this sense, at least, it is fair to say that
the Richmond plurality was responsible for the line drawn by the Metro
majority. Yet the federal/state dichotomy is hard to justify as applied in these
cases and, more importantly, it is a dichotomy in which the Supreme Court did
not really believe.
The Brennan opimon went on to apply intermediate scrutiny to the FCC's
programs. The federal government had an important interest m increased
diversity of broadcast programming, as shown by congressional and FCC
policy statements and judicial descriptions of the agency's mission. 105 This
102 Metro, 497 U.S. at 564-65 (footnote omitted). Compared to Richmond, the judicial
lineup was apparently quite clear. Justice Biennan's entire opinion spoke for the five Justice
majority. Id. at 552-601. Justice Stevens issued a brief concurring opinton, id. at 601-02;
Justice O'Connor issued an opinion that spoke for all dissenting Justices, id. at 602-31;
Justice Kennedy issued a dissenting opinion that also spoke for Justice Scalia, id. at 631-38.
As shown below, however, the majority opinion may be more artificial than real, and the
law of affirmative action was not substantially clarified by Metro any more than it had been
by Richmond. See infra Parts IL.C, 1I.C.
103 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text. In Metro, the Court concluded that
Richmond in effect reaffirmed Fullilove to approve federal affirmative action on
comparatively lenient terms. Metro, 497 U.S. at 563-66.
104 Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
105 Metro, 497 U.S. at 566-68.
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portion of the opinion was not particularly controversial within the Court; the
dissenters' real concerns were with the use of the "important" rather than the
"compelling" standard.1 6
Justice Brennan's conclusion that the programs were substantially related to
that interest was more controversial. The opinion tracked FCC and
congressional conclusions that having a larger number of minority group
members involved in broadcasting would result in greater programming
diversity.10 7 The majority argued that in assessing the relationship between the
program and the government's interest, the Court "must pay close attention to
the expertise of the Commission and the factfinding of Congress .. -108 By
deferring to the other branches on the sufficiency of the means-ends
relationship, the Court in effect further lessened the intensity of its review,
arguably to near the rational basis level.109 Much of the remaining discussion
in the majority opinion explains the Court's reasoning process on the
"substantially related" question. It first noted the nature of the conclusions by
the FCC and Congress on the effects of increased minority involvement in the
industry. The opinion dismissed claims that the agency's decision constituted
racial stereqtyping, and pointed to other settings in which racial diversity is
believed likely to produce a greater mix of opinions and attitudes.110
The opinion then turned to process. Here the discussion followed two
106 See z4 at 603 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The Court abandons this traditional
safeguard against discrimination for a lower standard of review, and in practice applies a
standard like that applicable to routine legislation."). Justice Kennedy did challenge the
importance of broadcasting diversity, characterizing it as "trivial." Id. at 633.107 Id. at 569-79.
108 Id. at 569.
109 That is, by deferring to Congress and the FCC to such a degree, the Court acted
much as it does in rational basis cases. Having found broadcasting diversity to be
"important," its next job under intermediate scrutiny was to see whether diversity in
ownership was "substantially related" to that objective. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text. Deference to the factual findings concerning the connection. in this
setting was tantamount to finding that Congress and the agency acted rationally in
concluding that the means were substantially related to broadcasting diversity. Neal Devins
argues that the majority's use of intermediate scrutiny was "pure sophistry," Devins, supra
note 27, at 145, and Charles Fried notes that the Court had never before used such a weak
standard, Fried, supra note 25, at 112.
110 See Metro, 497 U.S. 547, 579-84 (1990) (addressing stereotyping and various
respects in which ownership and management influence broadcasting content). The majority
accurately pointed out that the Court had endorsed racial diversity as a vehicle for achieving
a diversity of ideas, it. at 579-80 (citing Umversity of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 313 (1979); for assuring fair criminal trials, rt. at 583 (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474 (1990)); and for yielding more representative legislative bodies, id. (citing United
Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)).
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major tracks. First, these were not hastily drawn programs; there was every
indication that they were implemented only after careful study and attempts to
reach their objectives without the use of racial preferences.' 11 Second, the
Court noted the procedural steps available to force reconsideration by the
agency or to ensure appropriate implementation of the programs. n 2 The final
discussion in the majority opinion drew heavily on one of the equal protection
themes, the burden on innocent persons. The majority acknowledged the
relevance of burden, but found it relatively insubstantial under these programs.
No license holder would be deprived of its license; no applicant has a
legitimate expectation of receiving a license; and these preferences had
apparently resulted in only a relatively small number of agency decisions." 13
The Court took care to note, however, that the appropriate test is whether the
program "impose[s] undue burdens on nonminorities."114
Justice Stevens wrote a brief concurring opinon emphasizing two points.
In accordance with his views m Richmond, he noted with approval the Court's
"focus on the future benefit, rather than the remedial justification," 1 5 of such
race-conscious legislation. He then discussed why racial classifications are
appropriate in this setting, focusing on the fact that no stigma or value
I" Metro, 497 U.S. at 584-94.
112 Id. at 594-96. There is an irony to this discussion. Affirmative action m broadcast
licensing was instigated by the D.C. Circuit, which directed the FCC to develop, suitable
programs. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cet. demed, 419 U.S. 986
(1974). Then, also in response to a D.C. Circuit decision, Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192
(D.C. Cir. 1985), the agency began an inquiry into its various programs to enhance
diversity in broadcasting ownership and management. Notice of Inquiry on Racial, Ethmc
or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C.Rcd. 1315 (1986) (Docket 86-484). Appropriations
legislation enacted by Congress prohibited the FCC from using government funds to
reconsider these policies. Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub.L. 100-
202, 101 Stat. 1329-31; see Metro, 497 U.S. at 560 & n.9. The FCC accordingly ended its
reconsideration. Reexamination of Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, Order, 3
F.C.C.Rcd. 766 (1988); see 497 U.S. at 627-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (challenging the
sufficiency of FCC and congressional consideration of pertinent issues); cf. Devins, supra
note 27, at 136-41 (criticizing the nature of congressional action concerning the FCC's
programs).
113 Metro, 497 U.S. at 596-606.
114 Id. at 597. This, of course, has two effects that are capable of causing confusion in
future cases. It acknowledges the relevance of such burdens, thereby adding to the issues
that must be considered. In addition, the majority's somewhat abstract treatment of burden
is likely to make the issue more divisive than necessary m future cases, as a burden that is
slight in the abstract may appear to be severe to other observers who examine the issue m a
different context. Here, for example, Justice O'Connor described the burdens imposed on
nonminority broadcast applicants as very severe. See id. at 630-31.
115 Id. at 601.
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judgment results from the classification. 116 Significantly, he continued to
eschew the language of the tiers of judicial review, thereby undercutting the
impression that a majority of the Court really supported use of intermediate
scrutiny. 117
The four remaining Justices dissented. All signed a lengthy opinion by
Justice O'Connor, the author of the plurality opinion in Richmond. Their Metro
dissent began with an emphasis on the individual nature of the equal protection
guarantee and an insistence on use of strict scrutiny.' 1 8 In light of the Fullilove-
Richmond federal/state dichotomy, it was necessary for the dissenters to
distinguish Fullilove. The O'Connor opinion did this by means of both
technical legal analysis and argument based upon equal protection principles.
The dissent's technical argument was that Fullilove did not set a rule for federal
race-conscious legislation in general, but instead set a narrow principle
applicable only to congressional actions taken under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment "that seek to remedy identified past discrimination. " 119
The somewhat ard tone of this discussion in both the majority and the dissent
belies a depth of feeling that is revealed by the use of code words drawn from
the equal protection debate. Justice O'Connor suggested, for example, that the
majority "endorse[s] race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation
divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility
and conflict." 120
The next sections of the O'Connor opinion challenged the propriety of
affirmative action for nonremedial purposes, in essence insisting on backward-
looking programs. This discussion too is less a scholarly examination of legal
doctrine concerning compelling purposes than an essay on the negative aspects
of race-conscious decisionmaking. In order to underscore the amorphousness of
the majority's diverse viewpoints rationale, Justice O'Connor restated the need
116 I'd.
117 Id. at 601-02. Because Justice Stevens's vote was necessary to form a majority, his
opposition to reliance on the tiers ofjudicial review means that no true majority existed on
the standard of review. See infra notes 135-38, 261-63 and accompanying text. He did
note, however, that he "jom[ed] both the opinion and the judgment of the Court." Id. at
602.
118 Id. at 602-03.
119 Id. at 607. The O'Connor opinion further challenged the majority on the synthesis
of Fulliove and Richmond. She pointed out that Fullilove did not utilize intermediate
scrutiny, id. at 608-09, that Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), see mnfra note 128,
established that the federal government was subject to the same equal protection restrictions
as the states, Metro, 497 U.S. at 604, and that the approval of the racial set-aside m
Fullilove was explicitly premised on its remedial objectives, id. at 607-08.
120 Metro, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990). Notions of stigma, discrmunation,
individualism, and community pervade tins discussion. Id. at 603-10.
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for a remedial justification. 121 She went on to criticize the connection between
diversity of ownership and diversity of programming, again stressing several of
the underlying themes of equal protection analysis. These included the FCC's
(and the majority's) conclusions about likely programming differences, which
the dissenters saw as racist and based on stereotypes, the failure to consider
other, less offensive, methods of achieving the desired result; and the burden
on innocent persons. 122 The dissenters thus concluded that the programs failed
equal protection analysis, even under the ground rules of fairly lenient scrutiny
established by the majority. 123
In accordance with their particularly vehement disapproval of affirmative
action in Richmond, Justices Kennedy and Scalia submitted a second dissenting
opinion. Their analysis was very firmly rooted m themes from the equal
protection debate. The opinion repeatedly characterized the majority as
revitalizing Plessy v. Ferguson's124 tolerance for racial inequality, alluded to
Nazi laws defining racial classes, and quoted the benign, multicultural
121 Id. at 610-16. Justice O'Connor recognized that minorities are substantially under-
represented in broadcasting ownership and management, but pointed out that the FCC's
programs were never perceived as remedial, and therefore could not meet the "narrowly
tailored" requirement by definition. Id. at 610-12. Tins section takes on the majority's
approval of generally benign programs, describing their indeterminate basis:
Divorced from any remedial purpose and otherwise undefined, "benign" means only
what shifting fashions and changing politics deem acceptable. Members of any racial or
ethnic group, whether now preferred under the FCC's policies or not, may find
themselves politically out of fashion and subject to disadvantageous but "benign"
discrimination.
Id. at 615.
122 See id. at 618-22, 625-29 (discussing inappropriate relationship between race and
behavior); zd. at 622-25 (discussing need to consider alternative means of achieving
broadcast diversity); id at 630-31 (discussing 'burden on non-minority broadcast
applicants).
123 Id. at 631. The dissenters necessarily would find that the FCC programs fail strict
scrutiny as well as intermediate scrutiny. In Richmond, Justice Marshall similarly challenged
the majority on both the standard of review and the merits. He argued for intermediate
scrutiny, but then suggested that the Richmond ordinance would satisfy the more demanding
scrutiny used by the majority. Richmond, 488 U.S. 469, 535-36 (1989) (identifying
compelling purposes); id. at 548-51 (noting respects in which the program appears to be
narrowly tailored). The fact that these groups of Justices can apply the standards of review
so differently suggests the extent to which choice of standard of review no longer appears to
dictate the outcome. See supra note 49; see also znfra notes 140-46, 248, 259-60, 265-69
and accompanying text.
124 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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assertions of South African Apartheid Policy.'1 5
C. Legal Synthesis
Richmond and Metro ended as they began, with a winner and a loser in
each case but no evident consistency within the Court. Of greater concern, both
the anger and the apparent lack of respect for opposing viewpoints seemed to
be getting stronger.
It is possible, of course, to reconcile the two cases. In the process,
however, the Supreme Court's treatment of affirmative action becomes even
more artificial than before. The principle that reconciles the cases as a matter of
legal doctrine is that Congress has much more leeway than states or local
governments in enacting. affirmative action programs. Richmond's vigorous
requirements of proof of past discrimination and narrow tailoring indicate that
few state programs will be found to be constitutional; Metro's less demanding
level of scrutiny, combined with its deference on factual issues, suggests that
most federal programs are likely to withstand judicial review.
This distinction is facially attractive as a compromise, but it constitutes
both an untenable reading of the various opinions and an idiotic interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause. The majority in Richmond made it clear that
the ordinance not only failed to be sufficiently effective to justify the extreme
remedy of a racial set-aside, but was insidious in concept and destructive in
operation. 126 Such faults do not disappear merely because it is the federal
government that has enacted the policy. On the other side, the majority in
Metro indicated their support of all properly motivated plans with a reasonable
chance of meeting approved objectives. 127 There is no serious argument that
they would think differently about state or local plans.
If the federal/state line does differentiate between compliance with and
125 See Metro, 497 U.S. 457, 631, 635 (1990) (references to Plessy); id. at 633 n.1
(Naz laws and South African policy); id. at 635 (Apartheid).
126 Various portions of the O'Connor opinion reveal the Court's hostility. See, e.g.,
Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493 ("the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate
uses of racism" and to describe the set-aside as a "Ighly suspect tool"); id. at 506
(describing preferences as "contrary to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional provision
whose central command is equality"); id. at 510 (noting the danger that a purportedly
benign classification "is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial
politics"); see also text accompanying supra note 77.
127 The Brennan opinion suggests the Court's openness to benign laws. See, e.g.,
Metro, 497 U.S. at 564 n.12 (noting that benign race conscious programs are well
established); id. at 566-68 (describing the benefits of diversity to the entire public); id. at
572 (noting a "long history of congressional support for minority ownerslp policies"); id.
at 579-80 (asserting that diversity of views will result in the aggregate).
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violation of the Equal Protection Clause, it is a new legal theory For nearly
forty years the Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause as incorporating the equal protection guarantee and imposing the same
obligations on the federal government as on the states. 128 Perhaps this was a
mistake, 129 but the Court was not trying to correct it m these cases, even if that
is the practical result of its decisions.
Poorly reasoned decisions, even those that inadvertently change long-
established constitutional principles, are nothing unusual. What is worth noting
about the federal/state distinction is that a majority of the Justices themselves
repudiate it in these very cases. A comparison of Richmond and Metro reveals
that seven of the nine Justices voted consistently-either to uphold or to
invalidate both programs. 130 Of the two remaining Justices, Justice Stevens's
votes appear to be unconnected with whether the federal or a state government
was involved. Instead, his preference for forward-looking rather than remedial
legislation seemed to be dispositive. 131 Only Justice White apparently agreed
with the federal/state dichotomy; his unique views on the question establish the
doctrine only because of the peculiar nature of legal interpretation by majority
vote. 132
128 In Boiling V. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion case to Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court invalidated the segregated school system of the
District of Columbia. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment's Due Proces$ Clause
imposed on the federal government an equal protection responsibility indistinguishable from
that of the Fourteenth Amendment. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 497.
129 Robert Bork sharply criticizes Boiling as a rewriting of the Constitution, which
imposes the equal protection obligation only on the states. BORK, supra note 19, at 83. He
agrees with the Boiling Court that it would be outrageous for the federal government to
operate a segregated school system, but believes it is Congress's duty to act. Id. at 84. Of
course, Bork is himself willing to sacrifice constitutional theory for "good" results, as he
suggests he would rely on the Boiling principle to invalidate federal affirmative action. Id.
Bork's own inconsistency on the constitutional equal protection responsibilities of the federal
government in affirmative action cases differs from those of the Justices, but is consistent
with their inability to render coherent decisions. See generally infra Part IlI.
13 0 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun voted to uphold both programs. See
Richmond, 488 U.S. at 528; Metro, 497 U.S. 457, 550 (1990). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy voted to invalidate both programs. See Richnond,
488 U.S. at 476, 520; Metro, 497 U.S. at 602.
131 Neither of his opinions indicates any approval of the federal/state dichotomy. Both,
however, reaffirm Ins doubts about legislatively drafted remedies and Ins support for race-
conscious actions to serve other public objectives. See Richmond, 488 U.S. at 511-14 &
nn.1-3; Metro, 497 U.S. at 601-02. Moreover, Justice Stevens dissented in Fullilove v.
Klutzmck, 448 U.S. 448, 532-54 (1980), a position to which he adhered at least through
Richmond, 488 U.S. at 511 n.1, 517.
132 See nfra Part J.B, C.
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The Court only exacerbated this problem by couching its analysis in both
cases in terms of the standards of review. The debate over the constitutionality
of affirmative action programs has relatively little to do with the standards of
review. At best the standards suggest a mood: deference, hostility, or
something in between. Part of the problem may be that their utility as
shorthand has encouraged the Court to rely on them more than wisdom would
suggest. As Mark Yudof has suggested, by the 1970s the Court often seemed
to forgo careful analysis of individual problems and instead allowed its
decisionmaking to become "obscured by a philosophical and ideological
fixation on 'suspect' classifications." 13 3 If reliance on the tiers had worked, at
least we would have fairly consistent doctrine. But in fact the use of such gross
categorizations does not work where there is fundamental disagreement about
the factors that determine the level of scrutiny. 134
This has several ramifications, each evident m the various opinions in
Richmond and Metro. First, the Court falsely implied that there is doctrinal
clarity. The Metro majority opinion provides a good example. It asserts that
intermediate scrutiny applies to benign discrimination m federal programs. 135
Yet Justice Stevens's concurring opinion suggests that this assertion is
erroneous. First, his consistent disparagement of use of the tiers of review136
means that the Court was actually split four-four on the issue, with Justice
Stevens's "nontiered" approach just happening to coincide in the outcome
reached by the other majority Justices, who used intermediate review. Second,
his prior decisions and his concurring opinions in these two cases reveal that he
would not be deferential to legislative attempts to remedy prior
133 Yudof, supra note 8, at 1405.
134 If everyone could agree that a case required strict scrutiny, for example, all of the
Justices would give the case close attention; if they believed rational basis was appropriate,
they would be deferential. There would be disagreements about the application of these tests
to specific facts, cf supra note 123, but the disagreements would be more readily
containable and there would be fewer possible reasoning paths. With disagreement about the
appropriate tier of review, theoretical disagreements and possible results multiply. See infra
Part lII.C.
135 Metro, 497 U.S. at 564-65; see supra text accompanying note 102.
136 As with the problem of remedies as opposed to forward-looking objectives, see
supra note 131, Justice Stevens repeated his attitude toward the tiers m Ins concurring
opinons m both Richmond and Metro. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 514-15 & nn.5-6; Metro,
497 U.S. at 601 n.3. Both cases refer to his concurring opinion m Oty of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Livng Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), see supra note 48, in which Justice Stevens
described the appropriate inquiry in all cases as "rational basis." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
452-53; see Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Junsprudence, 100 HARV L. REv.
1146, 1147 (1987) (summarizing and praising the Stevens approach).
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discrimination. 137 It is thus likely that even a federal Richmond-like program
would have failed in the Supreme Court m 1990; Justice Stevens would in all
likelihood have joined the four Metro dissenters to invalidate the program, even
though the language of the Metro holding would seem to approve of such
programs. 138
Further problems exist with respect to the application of the standards of
review. It is and enough to debate whether a legislative purpose is
"compelling," (the lesser) "important," or (the mere) "legitimate." But aridity
turns to incoherence when such characterizations mask serious disagreements.
This state of affairs is evident in Justice Stevens's unusual view of
permissible objectives for affirmative action programs. The difference between
forward and backward-looking programs does not reflect the distinction
between "important" and "legitimate." The balance tipped simply because one
Justice who believes "forward" is better than "backward" (Stevens) broke an
apparent tie between four who find both acceptable (the other majority Justices
in Metro) and four who find both unacceptable, at least in this setting (the
dissenters). 139
Incoherence is also evident on the other side of the Court's internal dispute
over affirmative action. For example, the agreement of .five Justices m
Richmond to use "strict scrutiny' did not necessarily reflect any agreement on
its component parts. For example, the "narrowly tailored" component of strict
scrutiny appears to have no clear meaning. It may be significant thatJustice
O'Connor did not use the more common term, "necessary;" her analysis
certainly reveals a means inquiry less demanding than traditional strict
scrutiny. 140 Justice Scalia's concurrence, on the other hand, called for very
137 See supra note 131.
138 See supra text accompanying note 102.
139 More specifically, a "federal and forward" program can succeed m Supreme Court
litigation because
THREE (the Richmond dissenters who are consistently open to affirmative action)
PLUS ONE (Justice White, who appears to accept the federal/state dichotomy, see
znfra notes 249-55 and accompanying text)
PLUS ONE (Justice Stevens, who rejects the dichotomy but supports programs that
are forward-looking)
EQUALS FIVE.
Given the nature of all of the other opinions m these cases, it is likely that Justice
Stevens is the only Justice who favors forward-looking to remedial purposes. Such a
"tipping" vote, however, can make "law" even if the critical distinction is rejected by a
strong majority. See znfra Part IM.
140 Part V of Justice O'Connor's opinion purports to explain how state and local
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rigorous scrutiny, which would invalidate race-conscious decisionmaking
except in "a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and
limb-for example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of
inmates." 141 This is plainly a more traditional conception of strict scrutiny. 142
One possible ramification of the split within the Court is that litigants (and
lower courts) will try to water down strict scrutiny by adopting the O'Connor
approach in cases that deserve the more rigorous traditional test.143 In any
event, even though Justice Scalia pointedly refused to join this portion of
Justice O'Connor's opmion, thereby preventing an official majority on the
standard of review analysis, the overgeneralizations inherent in the use of
categorizations such as "necessary" and "narrowly tailored" are more likely to
governments can act to remedy past racial discrimination, Richmond, 488 U.S. at 509-11,
including "some form of narrowly tailored racial preference.., to break down patterns of
deliberate exclusion." Id. at 509. Her reluctance to use the "necessary" terminology so
consistent with virtually automatic invalidation, see supra note 49, is seemingly inconsistent
with the majority's insistence on symmetry and their refusal to distinguish bemgn from
malign classifications. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493-95. It may well be that the same Justices
implicitly recognize a distinction in motivation, and that distinction leads to their softening
the means portion of the test. Several commentators argue that a somewhat weaker version
of strict scrutiny is applied in such settings. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1452 n.2
(describing the Court as using a lesser standard than strict scrutiny); Choper, supra note 29,
at 261 (suggesting that the "narrowly tailored" requirement may be less than the
"necessary" requirement); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 546, 550 (noting some Justices do not
use traditional strict scrutiny and seeing two separate standards in this regard); c . Leedes,
supra note 3, at 13-14 (recognizing various levels of strict scrutiny but suggesting that
Ridmond uses "extremely strict scrutiny"). But see Farber, supra note 41, at 626 (using
"necessary" to describe the Richmond standard).
14 1 RidM nd, 488 U.S. at 520. Justice Kennedy also appears to adhere to that view.
See id. at 518-19.
142 E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (stating a racial classification must be
truly necessary to promote a compelling interest); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (stating traditional strict scrutiny used to review state welfare law); Kramer v. Umon
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969) (stating limitation fails to have "sufficient
precision" to meet necessity prong of strict scrutiny).
143 See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 58, at 340 (the use of strict scrutiny i Richnond
will weaken the test or be limited in application); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 551 (raising
concerns that the lesser strict scrutiny used in affirmative action cases will affect cases
involving invidious discrimination); cf. Williams, supra note 42, at 526-27 (noting different
versions of necessity arising out of Metro). Schwartz's concern is a serious one. If the courts
review invidious laws under the same test, some may erroneously be upheld. This seems
unlikely as a practical matter because of the still existing "compelling mterest" aspect of the
test, but reveals the potential for harmful confusion that results from the interpretation of
incoherent decisions.
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obstruct than to further the search for doctrinal clarity.
An additional problem relates to the grouping of issues under standard of
review analysis. When a court invalidates government action as unnecessary to
a compelling interest (or not tailored narrowly enough), the extent of agreement
on the particular flaws of the law may be unclear. 144 For example, the majority
components of Justice O'Connor's Richmond opinion catalog ways in which
the city's set-aside program was deficient. These include the failure of the city
council to make adequate factual findings concerning discrimination in
Richmond's contracting industry, its reliance on irrelevant evidence, the
inclusion of racial groups and ethnic groups not subject to past discrimination,
the failure to consider race-neutral alternatives, and the apparent racial
balancing. 145 But the structure of the majority's analysis begged the most
important question. We learn that the law violates equal protection if all of
these things are true, but we can only guess the status of a law that has only
some of these flaws. At least in this setting, "not narrowly tailored" is only an
umbrella characterization that describes a conclusion reached on evaluating "the
totality of the circumstances." We know that five Justices found that this
ordinance did not satisfy strict scrutiny, but we do not know-and cannot know
from such opinions-how critical a particular deficiency was to the outcome. 146
A final problem with opinions such as those m Richmond and Metro is that
they endeavor to reduce significant moral and philosophical questions to
artificial calculations of utility and levels of evidence. The constitutionality of
the Richmond program should not turn on how much evidence of past
144 In theory, this is not the case where a decision upholds a law. Each aspect of the
law must satisfy all requirements of the standard or else it would be struck down m whole
or in part. It is likely, however, that some differences are obscured, at least where one or
more Justices is using a less rigid version of strict scrutiny. Thus, five (or more) Justices
might believe that a particular aspect of the law is flawed, but if only four of them
determine that the flaw is sufficient on its own to invalidate the law, a decision upholding
the law may well hide the fact that five Justices fotind fault with a part of it. This may be
true of Metro in some respects. See infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
145 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 495-96, 498-508; see also supra text accompanying note
79 and note 140 and infra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
146 For example, it might be that if the city had tried nonracial alternatives that failed,
or if the set-aside were somehow more limited, two Justices would have switched sides to
vote to uphold the program notwithstanding the other flaws. In this setting, it is
exceptionally difficult to state whether a particular aspect of a program, such as Richmond's
unsupported inclusion of groups other than African Americans, is mconsistent with the
Equal Protection Clause. See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 27, at 1732 (noting that no
majority can agree on what is acceptable); cf. Scholar's Reply to Professor Fned, 99 YALE
L.J. 163, 164 (1989) ("ITihe law in this area contains complex guidelines and enumerates
relevant and irrelevant factors rather than absolute rules.").
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discrimination the city council's record contained, or on a rough measurement
of the weakness of the means-to-ends fit.147 And the validity of the FCC's
preference programs should not tam on the likelihood that minority licensees
will broadcast third world music. 148 If these were the real legal conclusions of
the Justices, we could accept them despite serious misgivings. But that is not
what is really going on in these cases. Instead, it is evident that the decisions
are based on different answers to fundamental questions of morals and the
philosophy of our form of government. The standards of review and their
phraseology are merely the forms into which Justices (and other lawyers) pour
their answers to the deeper questions. The forms obscure reality much as the
old common law forms of action obscured the real facts of a dispute.149 The
reality can still be found in the details-the philosophical language that leaks
147 In this sense, the dissent's elaboration of the undisputed facts of racial
discrimmation seems sufficient to justify some governmental action m this regard as a
simple matter of moral duty. See Richmond, 488 U.S. at 529-35; see also Rosenfeld, supra
note 27, at 1763 (noting that the history of official and societal discrimination m Richmond
was pervasive and systemic, and that tracing the causes of present effects is impossible). At
that point, some pragmatic reflections on efficient mechanisms would probably reveal that
use of the sorts of flexible and limited set-asides upheld in Fullilove should be permitted to
states and local governments as well. At a minimum, opponents should be required to
establish that other mechanisms would be equally effective in ending the effects of
discrimination. Cf Scholar's Reply, supra note 146, at 166 (characterizing Richmond as
"pragmatic and particularistic" at bottom).
148 Such justifications recognize pluralism in one sense, but deny the importance of
justice m defining the extent of pluralism that is appropriate. Cf Delgado, supra note 28, at
1222, 1230-31 (characterizing the role model notion as largely for the benefit of the
majority). It is beneficial to all segments of society to have diversity in broadcasting, and
diversity probably serves First Amendment policies as well, but if that were all the minority
preferences were about, there would seem to be easier and less controversial ways to
achieve them. See Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64
S. CAL. L. REv. 293, 357-60 (1991) (noting flaws in the Court's assumptions about the
efficacy of the FCC's programs). The more significant issue has to do with fighting
subjugation by seeking to instill confidence in and encourage efforts by "outsiders," largely
racial minorities. As Patricia Williams points out, in this country, "the most obvious means
of tearing down ... exclusivities is dispersion of ownership." Williams, supra note 42, at
537. Tins would seem particularly important in 'high profile" businesses such as
broadcasting.
149 For descriptions of the old system of writs and other forms of litigation, see
FLEMING JAMES ET AL., CIv PRocEDURR 140-41 (4th ed. 1992) (describing "compromises
and fictions" involved in common law pleading); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE 237-39 (1985) (describing writ system); JOSEPH H. KoFFLER & ALISON REPPY,
HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 31-67 (1969) (chapter entitled "The Development
of the Common Law Forms of Action").
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into opinions and in the very different worlds that these opinions describe. The
"law" set forth in the opinions, and especially the "law" that emerges from the
intersection (or collision) of the two cases, however, is not a reliable guide to
the Constitution or even to the Justices' views as to its meaning.
Richmond and Metro epitomize the practical difficulties of evaluating
Supreme Court opinions. Each case purports to present the views of a majority
of Justices, yet each fails to do so. Richmond's true majority is limited to
aspects of the case that were inextricably fact-bound, and while it is possible to
cobble together a working majority of five Justices approving use of strict
scrutiny, the strictness of that scrutiny is open to question. 150 Metro does
present a complete majority opinion, yet it is a fuzzy majority that may not
really agree on very much. 151 The intersection of the two cases reveals further
anomalies. First, the legal reconciliation of the two holdings appears to be
supported by only one Justice.152 Second, and more tellingly, the cases speak
different languages about affirmative action. The fact that different groups of
Justices set the tone of the prevailing opinions in the two cases is borne out by
the fact that, notwithstanding any techical rationalization of the holdings, one
opinion expresses hostility toward affirmative action while the other expresses
support.
III. JUDICiAL DECISIONMAKNG AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Scholars routinely chastise the Court for its splintering. Constitutional law
professors bemoan each new plurality opinion, amorphous majority, or
doctrinal zigzag. 153 Our students are generally and understandably baffled.
While the problem is not a new one, it is becoming more serious. 154 The first
150 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
152 See supra note 139 and infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
153 Most of the sources identified in the notes to this Section indicate some dismay with
the Court's apparent inability to draw straight doctrinal lines. In particular, see Laura K.
Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by the Rehnqust Court, 23
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 777, 820 (1990) (criticizing splintered decisions as undercutting the
Court's role); John F Davis & William L. Reynolds, Jurdical Cripples: Plurality Opinions
in the Supreme Court, 1974 DuKE L.. 59, 64 (noting the lessened unpact of cases with no
majority opinion); Ralph S. Spritzer, Multiple-Issue Cases and Multi-Member Courts:
Observations on Decision Makang by Discordant Minorities, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 139, 141-45
(1988) (addressing several exceptionally confusing decisions, including Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972), see infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text).
154 See Davis & Reynolds, supra note 153, at 260 (pointing out that plurality opimons
were not common until the last several years of the Warren Court); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. Rnv. 133, 147 (1990) (noting major increase
[Vol. 55:79
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
two sections of thns Part trace some of the possible reasons for incoherence,
while the final section synthesizes these theories and applies them to Richmond
and Metro.
A. Opinions, Holdings, and Precedent
American judicial practice in appellate decisionmaking follows neither the
British nor the continental model. Under the British "seriatim" model, each
judge expresses his or her individual reasoning.155 The continental model is at
the opposite extreme; one anonymous opinion for the Court explains its
collective judgment. 156 Our nation's tradition is somewhere in the middle.
Chief Justice Marshall established the practice of issuing one opinion for the
Court, but there are no limitations on separate opinions or dissents. 157
One result of this compromise is the uncertain role of the individual
Justice. On one hand, a Justice is a member of a deliberative body with a
culture that points toward the development of stable doctrine. This is in
keeping with the Marshall model, which depends on consistent reasoning and
reliance on .precedent to provide a stable, predictable body of law. 158 As a
in multiple opinions at the Supreme Court); Ray, supra note 153, at 778 (noting a major
increase in concurring opinions); Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme
Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756, 756 (1980) (noting increase in plurality
opinions); Note, Plurality Decsons and Judical Deczsromnaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127,
1129 (1981) (stating that plurality decisions used to be rare).
155 Justice Ginsburg's article, Remarks on Writing Separately, addresses the English
model and contrasts it to standard United States practices. Ginsburg, supra note 154, at
134-35.
156 See Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SuP. CT. REv 208
(suggesting that our system of opinions is in a formal sense the opposite of'the European
model); see also Ginsburg, supra note 154, at 133-34 (arguing that the European system
remains focused on the myth of the right answer).
157 Early Court decisions tended to follow the English model. See, e.g., Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Justice Ginsburg suggests that the Marshall Court's
approach took some of the strengths of the English system and joined them with the more
bureaucratic aspects of the civil law tradition. See Ginsburg, supra note 154, at 136-39. She
argues that the hybrid nature of our system has its positive aspects, such as the
accountability that results from publicly revealed votes and authors, and the heightened
impact of the occasional unsigned per curain decision. Id. at 139; see also Kelnan, supra
note 156, at 209 (noting that in reality American judges achieve a substantial degree of
agreement on core issues).
158 Numerous commentators address the values of a system based on precedent. See,
e.g., ARTHUR I. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JusICE 75-76 (1971) (pointing to uniformity, practical
confidence, protecting judges by reliance on objective standards, helping private entities to
organize their activities, reduced litigation, and eliminating unfair surprise); Frank H.
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result, a judicial ethos developed against issuing -separate opinions in most
instances. In the past, Justices often decided not to write separately or chose to
issue concurrences limited to an enigmatic statement of agreement with the
judgment.1 59 Yet the refusal to adopt the continental model permitted Justices
to set forth and maintain individual views, 160 and modem Justices have been
far less willing than their predecessors to suppress their individual views. In
part this is rooted in changing perceptions of the duty of the individual
members of the Court in applying law,16' but it also seems to relate to the
Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judiaal Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 422, 422-
23 (1988) (citing easier judicial decisionmaking and greater equality); Michael J. Gerhardt,
The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decionmakng and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 68, 70 n.8, 76-77, 83-89 (1991) (discussing of tangible and intangible benefits of a
precedent-based legal system); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 597-
602 (1987) (addressing the values of predictability, efficiency, stability); Christopher E.
Smith, The Supreme Court in Transition: Assessing the Legitimacy of the Leading Legal
Institution, 79 KY. L.J. 317, 335 (1990-91) (noting that stare decisis is deeply rooted, and
helps achieve stability and predictability); James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power that Shall
be Vested in Precedent: Stare Deciss, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L.
REV. 345, 347-48 (1986) (explaining that the American version of stare decims is largely
based on equal justice, predictability, economy, and stability); c Earl M. Maltz, Some
Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decsis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REV 47, 472-
80 (discussing of some of the adverse effects of the breakdown of stare decisis).
159 See, e.g., Wyman v. lames, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971) ("Justice White concurs m
the judgment" and portions of the Court's opinion); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S.
139, 142 (1968) (four Justices concur in three separate statements totaling eight lines of
print); Swam v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 228 (1965) (Justice Black concurring in result);
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 495 (1962) ("Mr. Justice Black concurs in
the result"). See generally Ray, supra note 153, at 779 (comparing past and present
practices in this regard).
To some degree, the problem may be less one of general trends than of individual
styles. Justices Black and Harlan, very different mi constitutional views but both deeply
committed to the nature of the Court's mission and the judicial process, were frequent
concurrers. Justice White, of course, remained on the Court until 1993 and was as
provocative by his silent acquiesences in majority opinions as by Ins silent concurrences, as
in Wynan. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
160 See Novak, supra note 154, at 760 (pointing to increased flexibility, innovation,
and creative analysis as side benefits of judicial freedom m responding to precedents);
Aimee Imundo, Note, Paradoxical Voting in the Supreme Court, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
867, 879 (1990) (noting disagreements about the duties of individual Justices in following
precedent and the adverse effects of repressing disagreement on the Court).
161 Kelman describes such Justices as "soloists," who generally vote in accordance
with their own theories, regardless of the views of other members of the Court or prior
decisions. See supra note 156, at 263.
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changing nature of the questions presented to the COurt.162
1. Stare Dectsis
Commentators routinely cite the advantages of a system of stare decisis, 163
but recent years have witnessed an enormous increase in the amount of
overruling done by the Supreme Court. 164 The increased willingness of Justices
to set forth their individual views may in part be attributed to this decline in the
vitality of stare decisis. That principle has always existed in tension with the
notion that a court should correctly decide cases before it. The tension was
usually resolved through principles that account for the value of prior
decisions, but do not require courts to honor all implications or logical
corollaries of those decisions. One example is the common practice of limiting
a previous case to its facts. 165 Lawyers recognize the practice for what it often
is: jettisoning a prior holding without admitting that to be the case.166 Another,
162 See infra notes 187-88, 244-46 and accompanying text; see also Ginsburg, supra
note 154, at 147-48 (noting that the Supreme Court issues more non-unammous decisions
than m past years, and attributing this m part to the Court's certiorari policy, which leaves
only the most controversial cases on the Court's docket); Novak, supra note 154, at 759
(stating that the increased number of highly controversial issues coming before the Court
means Justices will adhere to their views m more cases, resulting m fewer majorities and
more pluralities).
163 See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 158, at 73 (characterizing precedent as part of a
dialogic system of law); Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court, A Telling Court Opimon,
N.Y. Times, July 1, 1992, at Al (noting importance of stare decisis as part of judicial
restraint to the three Justice plurality m Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992)); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudtcation, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 723, 750 (1988) (describing stare decists as one of the "passive virtues"); see also
supra note 158.
164 See Gerhardt, supra note 158, at 120-21 (discussing overrulings in several 1991
criminal cases); Maltz, supra note 158, at 467 (tracing the Court's openness to overruling
precedents back to 1937); Monaghan, supra note 163, at 742 (analyzing the Court's
willingness to overturn precedent); Rehnquist, supra note 158, at 345 (analyzing the Court's
willingness to overturn precedent, focusing on Garcia v. San Antoio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
165 Justice Goldberg criticized the practice of "narrowly defining the rule of a case m
order to distinguish the precedent to tatters," and suggested that the Court must follow the
spirit of prior decisions if it is properly to follow precedent. GOLDBERG, supra note 158, at
76; see also Easterbrook, supra note 158, at 424 (describing such manipulation of doctrine
as inevitable but usually wrong).
166 . Imundo, supra note 160, at 879 (suggesting that mconsistent decisions are
inevitable because stare deeisis is necessarily manipulable). This is, m essence, Judge
Easterbrook's position, expressed through his us& of Arrow's Theorem. See infra Part TIH.B.
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even less candid approach, is to distinguish the indistinguishable-to assert that
this case differs from a previous case and rely on the finality of Supreme Court
decisions to avoid further debate on the matter. 167 These techniques work as
long as a majority is willing to honor the group action. As many as four
dissenters can claim as loudly as possible that a prior decision mandates a
different result, but five beats four every time on the Court.
Disingenuous techniques reflect the authority of a court rather than the
strength of its legal reasoning. The irony is that several legitimate arguments
support a limited role for stare decisis in constitutional decisionmaking. First,
stare decisis has never been a particularly strong doctrine in constitutional
litigation. Unlike errors of statutory interpretation, for example, which can be
corrected by Congress, errors of constitutional interpretation can be corrected
in no other forum. Some Justices, therefore, have suggested that the Court is
not even theoretically bound by the doctrine in constitutional cases. 168 The
underlying premise of constitutional interpretation helps to shape the argument:
the Court is interpreting and applying the document itself, not previous
opinions that merely interpreted it at some earlier time: 169 In theory then,
167 See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 158, at 374 (noting the Court's sorry history of
reconciling and distinguishing precedents in the various "free speech at shopping centers"
cases of the 1970s). Tins also seems to be Justice Goldberg's point. If Justices (or courts)
can evade precedents sunply by announcing that this case is different from the previous
case, all of the values of a precedential system vanish despite maintaining the system as a
matter of form.
168 See generally Ginsburg, supra note 154, at 141 (noting Justice Brennan's practice);
Maltz, supra note 158, at 468 (critiquing the Brandeis view); Monaghan, supra note 163, at
741 (noting general weakness of stare decisis m constitutional law); Rehnquist, supra note
158, at 351 (noting Justice Brandeis's approach); Note, Constitutional Stare Deans, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1344, 1346-48 (1990) (discussing views of Justices Brandeis, Douglas, and
Scalia). But see Easterbrook, supra note 158, at 429-32 (challenging the conventional
wisdom, noting the value of stare deems in constitutional cases).
169 See, e.g., Charles S. Cooper, Stare 'Deasis: Precedent and Pnncple in
Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv 401, 405 (1988) (characterizing stare
deems as a common law principle); Rehnquist, supra note 158, at 365-66 (focusing on the
written nature of our Constitution and Chief Justice Marshall's explanation of judicial
review m Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-80 (1803) (setting out the
premises of constitutional supremacy). This notion is, of course, underscored by ongmalist
theories. See Robert A. Burt, Precedent and Authofity in Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 12
CARDozo L. REv. 1685, 1687 (1991) (noting that Justice Scalia is not deferential to
precedent because the original intent of the framers is the only legitimate source of
constitutional interpretation); Gerhardt, supra note 158, at 133 (noting that ongmalist
theories have the least respect for precedent). Other modem views concerning the judicial
role are also consistent with this denigration of precedent. E.g., Spritzer, supra note 153, at
140 (arguing that "the ultimate responsibility to render a judgment in accordance with one's
[Vol. 55:79
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
derogating precedent is "turning back from a .wrong turn" rather than
"changing the law," as it is sometimes characterized. 170
Such attitudes toward stare decisis have changed the nature of the debate.
In the past the question seemed to be, was the previous court so wrong that we
should disregard precedent? In the present the question is more likely to
concern whether there is a coherent theory for the "intermittent invocation of
stare decisis." 171 At bottom, stare decisis seems to serve as just one additional
factor to support the side that would prevail under a consistent ruling.172 The
notion that often appears to govern is that stare decisis should be binding
"absent a showing of substantial countervailing considerations." 173
Today, Justices sometimes seem to see those countervailing considerations
whenever they disagree with a prior decision. Federal Judge Frank Easterbrook
writes: "Today's Justices cast their votes as if prior cases did not exist, adding
for good measure (often with transparent insincerity) that 'even if the earlier
case were binding on me, I would still -vote the same way because .'"174
conception of the law is individual and non-delegable").
170 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 169, at 408 (arguing that the Court should not extend
erroneous holdings). This theory has strength only as long as one presupposes that the prior
decision in fact was wrong. The prevailing option in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791 (1992), presents a different outlook. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
suggested that they might not have voted with the majority in Roe v. Wade, 410 TJ.S. 113
(1973), but nonetheless accepted it as precedent. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-12.
171 Monaghan, supra note 163, at 743.
172 See generally Note, Constitutional Stare Dectsts, supra note 168, at 1346-47
(discussing standard arguments). Other views largely boil down to some form of this idea,
with various different triggering factors. E.g., GOLDBERG, supra note 158, at 74 (arguing
that stare decsis has "uneven force"-nearly absolute when the Court is asked to limit
rights against the government but "markedly less restrictive" when the opposite is at stake);
cf Gerhardt, supra note 158, at 141-42 (addressing the Israel approach); Jerold H. Israel,
Gideon v. Wainwright, The Art of Ovemding, 1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 211, 219-26
(identifying three "techniques of overruling'"-factors that justify departing from precedent);
Kelman, supra note 156, at 234-36 (noting that there are reasons for and against deferring
to recent precedents); Maltz, supra note 158, at 371 (describing various factors for
determining whether changing the law is appropriate); Rehnquist, supra note 158, at 371
(suggesting stare decisis should be applicable only when its irvocation serves the doctrine's
purposes).
173 Monaghan, supra note 163, at 757. Professor Monaghan's theory is a strong one,
as noted by Michael Gerhardt. Gerhardt, supra note 158, at 141. Still, it suffers from the
underlying problem it attempts to solve-indeterminacy. At best, "substantial countervailing
considerations" suggests a mood of deference rather than a workable definition of which
precedents should be binding.
174 Easterbrook, supra note 158, at 429. Similar judicial straddles can be seen in other
respects. For example, a Justice may say that even under the majority's analysis, its result is
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This attitude is neither new nor particularly well hidden, 175 but it is consistent
with the newest fashions among legal theorists. Commentators suggest, for
example, that stare decisis came into being more through habit than design,176
and is therefore dispensable upon a showing of disutility. One such argument
stresses the difficulty of amending the Constitution, with a resulting need to
accomplish constitutional changes through judicial flat. 177 And in a setting in
which conservative Justices have been increasingly able to dominate the Court's
business, it is no surprise to find conservative legal theorists challenge the
underlying premises of stare decisis in order to take the opportunity to revisit
liberal precedents. Thus, former Reagan Justice Department official Charles
Cooper argues that stare decisis has two critical failings: it is "inherently
subjective" and its only purpose is to "shelter error." 178
Conservatives have no monopoly on attacks on stare decisis, however.
When the Supreme Court was overturning well-established conservative
decisions to enunciate new constitutional doctrines supported by political
wrong. Tis occurred, for example, in Metro, in which Justice O'Connor disputed use of
intermediate scrutiny, but then argued that even if such scrutiny were appropriate, the
FCC's preference programs were unconstitutional. In addition, a Justice may dissent in a
case but accept that it is binding precedent, and then in later cases describe its holding much
more narrowly than he or she did in the original dissent. In this respect, for exaniple, the
Fulliove-Richnond-Metro distinction between federal and state affirmative action changes
shape case-by-case as different Justices found themselves playing the reconcile/distinguish
game. See supra notes 126-29 and infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
175 See William 0. Douglas, Stare Decss, 49 COLuM. L. Rnv 735, 754 (1954)
(indicating little respect for precedents he would have decided differently); see also Burt,
supra note 169, at 1685-86 (suggesting that Justice Scalia relies on precedent only when it
concurs with his views); Gerhardt, supra note 158, at 130 (noting that Clhef Justice
Rehnquist respects only those precedents with which he agrees); Smith, supra note 158, at
337, (noting that the Court's new conservative majority is very willing to find reasons to
ignore precedent); Note, Constitutional Stare Decass, supra note 168, at 1348-49 (noting
that to some persons, the reasons to overrile always outweigh precedent). But see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803-16 (1992) (opinion of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter).
17 6 Rehnquist, supra note 158, at 349. The author also notes that Grant Gilmore
concluded that the English system of precedent was far more flexible than our system that
developed under Chief Justice Marshall. This occurred because the use of one opinion for
the court limited opportunities for creative interpretations in later cases, while barristers
making careful and tactical selections from the several opintons underlying an English
judgment could more easily weave the "precedent" in unanticipated ways. Id. at 348 n.23
(citing GRAN GJLMORE, THE AGES OF AAMRCAN LAW 10 & n.10 (1974)).
177 See Rehnquist, supra note 158, at 364.
178 Cooper, supra note 169, at 404.
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liberals, the sides were simply reversed. 179 In -essence then, devotion to
precedent is largely a losing side's gambit.
Attempts to formulate a neutral theory of constitutional stare decisis
generally fail due to an inability to prescribe the strength of the prmciple.
Perhaps the most accurate formulation describes stare decisis today as a
presumption in favor of precedent-one that reminds judges to consider history
and context and not to overrule a prior decision in the absence of a "powerful,
fully articulated rationale." 180 In reality, however, that justification can
probably be found whenever a majority of Justices interpret constitutional
language differently from their predecessors. In this setting, stare decisis
degenerates to just another argument-one more reason to reach a particular
result.181
179 See, e.g., id. at 403. Justice Goldberg differentiated between decisions overruling
precedents to extend rights, in wnch stare. decisis is of little importance, and decisions
retracting them, in which stare decisis is properly a major obstacle. See supra note 172.
James Rehnquist challenges the notion of principled overruling, characterizing Supreme
Court decisionmaking as "a war of attrition," Rehnquist, supra note 158, at 346, and
suggests that virtually any decision can be attacked or defended -under the various
formulations of principled standards, id. at 358. The Supreme Court's recent sally into the
war over principled overruling in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), provides no
further help in tins regard. Cief Justice Rehnquist's description of appropriate redasons to
overrule prior decisions is not significantly different from Justice Marshall's. Compare id. at
2609-11 (majority) with id. at 2621-25 (dissent). In application, however, they differ
dramatically, and it is safe to assume that Payne is not the only case in wich their views as
to the application of such tests would differ.
My colleague, Widener law professor Leigh Greenhaw, argues that Justice Goldberg's
view presents a workable and principled test for distinguishing between the Warren Court's
derogation of precedent and more recent practices in the conservative direction. While tins
may work for some issues, it does not appear to be any less result-oriented than other
formulations for others. Most cases are not simply two-sided, with "rights" amassed against
governmental "power." The interests of others, from crime victims to consumers to
competitors, ultimately defeat any attempt to isolate sacrosanct "rights" from retractable
"non-rights." Affirmative action cases reveal the twists at the root of tlus problem. Are
decisions that recognize equal protection rights for nomnnorities and strike down
affirmative action plans, such as Richmond, essentially immune from reconsideration, while
decisions denying such constitutional rights, such as Metro, deserve little precedential
effect? Justice Goldberg's approach would seem to require this result, but it is hard to
believe that many adherents of Ins theory would choose to apply it in this fasion.
180 Note, Constitutional Stare Decuiss, supra note 168, at 1354.
181 Justice Goldberg restated this notion into the equally general "respect for
precedent." GOLDBERG, supra note 158, at 78; see also Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent
and Traditnon, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032 (1990) (noting that arguments from precedent may
have limited importance but are clearly pertinent in all settings); Schauer, supra note 158, at
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2. Plurality Decisions
Plurality decisions make an even greater contribution to incoherence. Once
rare, pluralities have now become common.18 2 Commentators have identified
numerous causes for the increase, none of which exclude the others. Some of
the more mundane factors suggested include the Court's workload and the
length of its opmions.18 3 Another factor, as suggested above, is the weakening
of stare decisis. When one or more Justices declines to acquiesce in a prior
decision, the Court becomes likely to split into three or more camps. This
occurs because such reconsideration of a position defeated in a previous case
creates an additional issue m the case before the Court. Where that issue
resolves the case for one or more Justices, less than a full Court is left to
consider the problem the Court intended to address when it granted review.
This makes it more likely that no opinion can command a majority.184 In short,
the more issues, the less likely is a clear majority.
There is little agreement about the propriety of Justices continuing to assert
their mdividual views. What can be seen by some observers as stubbornness or
a failure to seek reconciliation of viewpoints within the Court' 85 can also be
571; cf. Gerhardt, supra note 158, at 127 (arguing that even if the Justices agreed on any
particular formulation of the standard, they would disagree on when it had been satisfied).
Such views leave only an amorphous notion of precedent meaning "somethimg" in the
constitutional calculation, -and that "something" is unmeasurable.
182 See, e.g., Novak, supra note 154, at 756 (noting that there are now many more
plurality decisions than in the past); Ray, supra note 153, at 811 (noting that pluralities were
rare before 1955 but are now common); Note, Plurality Dectsons, supra note 154, at 1127
(noting that such opinions are now common).
183 See, e.g., Novak, supra note 154, at 759 (noting workload, issues, personalities);
Note, Plurality Decmons, supra note 154, at 1136 (arguing that long opinions can result in
pluralities as they provide more opportunities for a Justice to find an idea with wich he or
she disagrees). Justice Ginsburg suggests that the itacreased number of law clerks and the
ease of writing opinions by computer have possibly exacerbated this problem. Ginsburg,
supra note 154, at 149.
184 One Justice stubbornly voting in adherence with a previously defeated position
leaves only eight Justices to address the question that is properly before the Court. Five
votes are still necessary to constitute a majority; it is harder to find five votes out of eight
than five out of nine. The matter is exacerbated if two (or more) Justices refuse to confront
the issue the rest of the Court perceives to be presented, as five votes from the Court are
still necessary to constitute a majority. See Spritzer, supra note 153, at 141-45 (addressing
various cases in which such decisionmaking occurred); see also infra notes 238-41 and
accompanying text.
185 See Smith, supra note 158, at 327 (noting the importance of personality in affecting
group decisionmaking); Note, Plurality Decisions, supra note 154, at 1130 (criticizing the
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seen as following principle. 186 Aggravating these problems-and perhaps the
root cause of the tendency of Justices to hold to individual views-is the nature
of the issues regularly confronting the modem Court. Pluralities are most likely
to occur in cases presenting fundamental constitutional issues, and Justices are
more likely to continue to follow deeply held beliefs m these cases than in those
presenting technical problems of statutory mterpretation. 187 There is no social
consensus in this nation over many issues, and the open-ended clauses of the
Constitution are increasingly their battlegrounds. 188 The lack of clear resolution
manifested by plurality opinions is therefore hardly surprising.
One commentator suggests that pluralities be separated into three
categories: false, illegitimate, and true.189 In the false category, there is really a
majority on dispositive issues, and any additional opinions merely set forth
additional ideas. 190 Illegitimate pluralities arise when one or more Justices
prevents agreement on the reasoning of a decision simply by refusing to
acquiesce in prior holdings that still command majority support. 191 Finally,
there are true pluralities, which reflect a failure of a majority of the Court to
agree on the applicable principles. 192 The opinions in Richmond and Metro
have elements of these categories as well as of a fourth, the constructive
plurality, in which a plurality appears in the guise of a majority. 193
"tendency of some Justices to cling dogmatically to their initial views on an issue, and the
concomitant inability of the Court to settle that issue with any degree of finality").
186 See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 156, at 257 (noting that deep conviction is an
appropriate reason for adhering to a dissenting view); Spritzer, supra note 153, at 140
(stating that a Justice's "ultimate responsibility [is] to render a judgment in accordance with
[his or her] conception of the law...").
187 See, e.g., Davis & Reynolds, supra note 153, at 80 (noting that Justices cannot
resolve and come to clear majorities in constitutional cases presenting strong opposing
views); Kelman, supra note 156, at 248, 253 (noting that sustained dissents occur most often
m the most controversial constitutional areas, such as death penalty and First Amendment
issues); Novak, supra note 154, at 759 (noting that plurality opimons occur most often m
the most controversial areas).
188 See Note, Plurality Deczons, supra note 154, at 1138 (referring to increased
litigation over the application of such clauses to our modem, nonconsensus society).
189 Id. at 1130. See also infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text (discussing
Professor Ray's categories of concurring opinions).
190 Id. at 1130-33.
191 Id. at 1133-35. The author describes the illegitimate plurality as a "particularly
extreme example ofjudicial indulgence." Id. at 1133.
192 Id. at 1135-39.
193 A constructive plurality is the opposite of a false plurality. In a false plurality, a
majority position is ludden by the failure of a fifth Justice to support an opinion that he or
she agrees with m substance. For example, by insisting on his rigorous version of strict
scrutiny and therefore failing to join Justice O'Connor's four Justice opinion in Richmond,
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A very natural tendency of legal scholars is to declare that plurality
opinions are undesirable. Pluralities do not provide much guidance and
necessarily carry little precedential weight.194 They can also yield paradoxical
results in which the "winner" of the case loses on each issue considered
separately.' 95 Sometimes they have the practical effect of placing too much
importance on the views of swing Justices or those with idiosyncratic views. 196
Perhaps most fundamentally, however, pluralities undercut the Court's role
under the Constitution. By representing only the views of individual Justices
rather than "the Court," they diminish the Court's status as the body that
provides content to the airy phrases, of the Constitution. 197 Pluralities announce
something like: "We agree on who wins, but we cannot agree on the role of the
Constitution m this setting."
Diminished status for the Court in general would fundamentally change the
Justice Scalia prevented an official majority on the application of strict scrutiny to
affirmative adtion, even though Ins version plainly encompassed the O'Connor version. A
constructive plurality, on the other hand, has what purports to be a majority opinion that
upon examination turns out to represent different views sheltered under one rubric. Portions
of Richmond and Metro fall into this category. In this sense, the Court's two techniques for
obscuring its incoherence, the false majority and the overgeneralized conclusion, see infra
notes 249-69 and accompanying text, are both really versions of the constructive plurality.
194 See, e.g., Davis & Reynolds, supra note 153, at 62 (noting that such opini9ns have
little weight and provide little guidance); Ginsburg, supra note 154, at 148-49 (describing
the problem and noting that multiple opimons in general can confuse lower courts and
attorneys); Note, Plurality Decsions, supra note 154, at 1127 (criticizing plurality opinions
as inadequate pronouncements, guides, and statements); cf. Novak, supra note 154, at 756-
58 (plurality opimons cause problems for lower courts and are at odds with the underlying
notion that reasoning is critical to American jurisprudence).
195 This occurs where different coalitions of Justices on different issues result in a
majority judgment that is logically supported by arguments that are themselves defeated.
For example, assume that there are two different defenses arguably present in a case, such
as a limitations period and immunity. Six Justices may believe that the limitations period has
not run, and six Justices may believe that there is no innmunity, leading to the "legal"
conclusion that neither defense is valid. But as long as the three Justices believing that the
period has run and the three Justices believing that the defendant 7s immune are at least five
different persons, a majority favors dismissing the action, despite two to one majorities
denying the validity of each defense.
196 One commentator notes that analyzing cases to determine the narrowest views
supported by a majority "vest[s] disproportionate power in the 'swing' Justice or Justices by
according their 'narrow' opinion controlling weight, even though the reasoning expressed
does not reflect a true consensus of the Court." Novak, supra note 154, at 765.
197 See Davis & Reynolds, supra note 153, at 61-66 (arguing that it is the Court and
not the arithmetic of the views of individual Justices that has a role in society to provide
leadership on constitutional and other legal questions).
[Vol. 55:79
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
nature of American government. Diminished status m the resolution of some
issues in certain areas, however, is not necessarily a bad idea. Plurality
decisions suggest that the case presents a problem that requires further study.
Rather than papering over disagreement with a weak and inconclusive but
apparent majority, it is probably preferable for the Court to admit some doubt,
and thereby to extend its consideration of the issues in question.198 To a great
extent the affirmative action cases prior to Richmond and Metro communicated
these messages. 199 It is doubtful that the two cases provide any clearer
statements of law, but by producing "majorities" they give the illusion of
having done so.
3. Separate Opirons
The proliferation of nonprevailing opinions, concurrences and dissents,
highlights the confusion engendered by contemporary judicial practices. My
colleague, Widener law professor Laura Ray, has identified four categories of
concurring opinions: the limiting concurrence, the expansive concurrence, the
emphatic concurrence, and the doctrinal concurrence. 2°° The limiting
concurrence, the most common form, takes a position narrower than that of the
majority;20 1 its converse is the expansive concurrence, which takes a broader
198 See, e.g., Novak, supra note 154, at 760, 780-81 (pointing out that false
agreements are not helpful and that plurality decisions serve to keep issues open and allow
further development); Ray, supra note 153, at 812-13 (noting that in some areas it may be
better "to prolong debate when the alternative is an uneasy compromise").
199 The failure of the Court to issue even mcoherent majority decisions m University of
Californa Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980), and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), meant that
supporters and opponents of affirmative action could continue to reshape their arguments to
reach positions that would attract majority support on the Court.
Changes on the Court necessarily exacerbate this process. To analogize to target
shooting, if one shoots and misses to the left, one aims a bit more to the right and tries
again. Changes on the Court make it a moving target, however, and for the last twenty-five
years it has been moving to the right, like the ducks in a shooting gallery that are hard to hit
no matter how carefully one arms.
200 Ray, supra note 153, at 780. Professor Ray describes concurring opinions as
"hybrids," and notes that the four categories serve very different roles. Id. One recent study
of concurring opinions from a recent Court term concluded that most did one of three
things: point out what issues remain open, express concerns about the majority's reasoning,
or provide an explanation that should be dispositive in cases as a result of the votes of the
Justices. David 0. Stewart, A Chorus of Voices, 77 A.B.A. J. 50 (1991).
201 Ray, supra note 153, at 784-93. Limiting concurrences are "expressions of
ambivalence." Id. at 785.
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view.2°2 The emphatic concurrence usually expounds on one aspect of the
majority opinion to stress its importance or explain its scope.203 Finally, the
doctrinal concurrence in essence rejects the majority's analysis but joins in the
judgment.204 Whatever their structure, concurrences present analytical
difficulties. Concurrences that purport to explain the majority's analysis are
particularly problematic, 205 but where accurate, such attempts at restatement
can clarify a decision or aid later attempts to apply it.20 6 Most commentators
call for restraint in issuing concurrences, suggesting that Justices avoid the
tendency to unnecessary self-expression and limit concurrences to cases in
which future legal analysis will be furthered. 207
202 Id. at 793-96.
203 Id. at 796:-800.
204 Id. at 800-09. Ray notes that on the present Court only Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, and Scalia regularly issue doctrinal concurrences. Id. at 803-07. Both Stevens
and Scalia did so in the affirmative action cases. See supra notes 80-87, 115-17 and
accompanying text.
205 Ray points out that such opinions sometimes bring about odd results, such as the
combination of "losing" positions that add up to a "winning" judgment: See id. at 800-01;
see also supra note 195. Justice Ginsburg also concludes that separate opinions that purport
to explain a majority opinion tend to be confusing and present obstacles to legal analysis.
Ginsburg, supra note 154, at 149.
206 If accurate, such opinions can provide useful guidance to lower courts and litigants.
See Ginsburg, supra note 154, at 143 (noting separate opinions may help clarify the opinion
of the Court and aid trial courts); Maltz, supra note 158, at 488-89 (noting these opinions
often explain how to comply with the law); Novak, supra note 154, at 774-77 (stating
sometimes one opimon becomes treated as authoritative, either through inadvertence or
because the author must be convinced for later litigants to prevail).
It is not surprising that Justice Powell is often cited for performing this function in his
separate opinions. E.g., Maltz, supra note 158, at 488-89; Novak, supra note 154, at 775.
Justice Powell was a -pragmatic and careful judge, who often found positions somewhere
between those of Ins more ideologically-onented colleagues. This is his legacy from
Umversity of Califorma Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in which his opinion m
effect became the Court's opinion and remains a major precedent in the area even though
no other Justice joined in the critical portions of Ins opinion. See znfra notes 277-78 and
accompanying text. Justice Harlan also issued helpful concurring opinons. His concurring
opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967), formulated the Fourth
Amendment concept "reasonable expectation of privacy," that has now become the central
prense of the Court's analysis, rendering the eight Justice majority opinon a historical
anomaly. See Robert C. Power, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 80 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10-14 & nn.39-43 (1989).
207 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 154, at 143, 150 (noting Justice Brandeis's practice
and calling for more restraint in issuing separate opinions); Ray, supra note 153, at 823-29
(favoring separate opinions, but noting problems that result from unnecessary opinions).
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One particularly nettlesome aspect of concurrences involves paradoxical
voting. This occurs when Justices deviate from their own views to vote with an
actual (or working) majority. Justices may do this for one or more of the
following reasons: to defer to the majority, to make a clear statement, to break
a tie on the Court, or to reach a particular result.208 Paradoxical voting seems
to be uncommon and therefore should rarely cause logically inconsistent
judgments. 2°9 Ironically the reverse practice, in which a Justice joins an
opinion that he or she does not really support, can hide the Justice's real views
and itself lead to inconsistent decisions.210 In any event, concurrences that
deviate in material respects from a qiajority opinion tend to lessen the impact of
a decision, and may strip it of significance if the existence of the majority
depends on the support of the concurring Justice.
Dissents can also cause confusion. On one level, of course, a dissent is
nothing more than a losing analysis directed as much to those who can change
the law as to the rest of the Court- or the parties. A dissent can have
significance for future cases, however, especially if it announces agreement in
the principle but disagreement in the application of the principle to the case
before the Court. More often, of course, dissents serve as statements of
principle for future, different, majorities, and provide a vehicle for keeping an
issue open as long as possible.211 There seem to be few impediments today to
208 See Imundo, supra note 160, at 868-74. In a sense, Justices voting to adhere to
precedents they believe to have been wrongly decided fit into this third category, because
the Justice votes m opposition to Ins or her individual interpretation of the law.
Commentators do not generally include such behavior m their analyses, and instead restrict
themselves to examining votes that differ from a Justice's reconciliation of interpretive
sources, including precedent. See id. at 867; John M. Rogers, "I Vote 77us Way Because
I'm Wrong:" The Supreme Court Justice as Epzmemdes, 79 KY. L.I. 439, 439-41 (1990-
91) (suggesting that such action reveals the inconsistency of multimember courts).
209 See Rogers, supra note 208, at 440; Spritzer, supra note 153, at 145 ("skewed
decisions of this kind are unusual"). Of course, voting consistently with one's views of the
case can also cause results that are logically mconsattent. See infra Part NI.B.
210 q. Imundo, supra note 160, at 879-80 (pointing out that if Justices repress their
disagreements by failing to set forth their views when they differ from their votes, they
make the law appear to be settled when m fact it is unsettled, also suggesting that
paradoxical votes perform a real function by serving as a compromise that allows a decision
to be made); Kelman, supra note 156, at 239-47 (discussing the related problem of the
sustained dissent). Part III.B includes a lengthy analysis of Judge Easterbrook's theory that
inconsistency is inevitable notwithstanding paradoxical voting or sustained dissent, and Part
II.C concludes that Richmond and Metro reveal the same problem.
211 See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 156, at 254 (noting this to be one of the positive
aspects of modem judicial practice in this regard). This is also true of other separate
opimons. Professor Ray notes, for example, that this is the case with doctrinal
concurrences. See Ray, supra note 153, at 802-03; supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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issuing dissenting opinions. Consistent with the modem trend of derogating
stare decisis, Justices often dissent at length and restate their views in case after
case.2 12 In any event, understanding multiple opinions is necessarily a part of
contemporary legal analysis.
B. Public Choice Theory
The various opinion writing practices described above comport with
analytical models associated with Public Choice Theory. Central to our legal
culture is the notion that group decisions are better than individual decisions.
Trial judges sit as individuals, but this is largely for practical reasons, and
group factfinders, better known as juries, are constitutionally required for many
determinations. 213 Appellate courts are group bodies; the paradigm appellate
case involves a group that considers written and oral arguments, debates the
merits at a conference, and issues a decision after careful deliberation.
Contemporary caseloads and personal styles of judging may prevent reality
from meeting that image,214 but the notion that a group will do better than a
single judge, is as much an underlying premise of our system as the idea that
judges should apply the law rather than their own policy beliefs.
212 Professor Kelman suggests three actions Justices can follow after dissenting in one
case. They can abandon their dissent, maintain their dissent in all future cases, or
temporarily acquiesce and await a propitious occasion to reinstate their earlier vote. See
Kelman, supra note 156, at 230-33, 248-50, 258-63. Kelman suggests that each of these
responses has advantages and disadvantages, but that sustained dissents are increasingly
common. Cf. Spritzer, supra note 153, at 145-46 (accepting persistent dissents as proper
unless the rest of the Court is equally divided).
In this setting, the traditional conservative approach to issuing dissents seems
anachronistic. Chief Justice Taft argued, consistent with the then existing Canons of Judicial
Conduct, that Justices should conform their views to those of the majority whenever
possible and firmly follow the precedent thereafter.'See Kelman, supra note 156, at 240 &
n.46; see also id. at 282 (showing Justice Harlan as the most recent consistent follower of
this approach); Imundo, supra note 160, at 876-77 (discussing changes in ethical obligations
of judges). Justice Brandeis's more selective practice of restraining hIs desire to dissent in
cases with only a narrow majority and not likely to result in seriously flawed doctrine, see
Ginsburg, supra note 154, at 143, seems more in keeping with statutory cases than
constitutional cases.
213 See U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI (criminal cases); U.S.
CONST. amend. VII (civil cases). The Sixth Amendment right has been incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment and applies to state criminal cases as well. Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968); see infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text. Most state
constitutions also recognize a right to a jury in civil cases.2 14 See supra Part M.A.
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The preference for group decisions overlooks one severe defect; groups do
not render decisions that are both coherent and consistent. Judge Frank
Easterbrook first applied this notion to judicial decisionmaking m his 1982
article, Ways of Criticizing the Court.215 He relied on Public Choice Theory,
which analyzes voting behavior to prove that legislative voting schemes do not
result m outcomes responsive to majoritarian preferences. 216 Or, as Professors
Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey state the problem: "Majority rule is its own
worst enemy." 217 Easterbrook's conclusion was that it is useless to criticize the
Court for inconsistency or incoherence because all institutional decisionmaking
has those attributes. 218
Easterbrook's article begins by 'describing some of the common criticisms
of the Supreme Court's output. It notes the usual suspects-plurality decisions,
too many dissenting opinions, the difficulty of the cases, and the extent of the
Court's workload-but suggests that the traditional solutions would themselves
lead to inconsistent results and would be ineffective m various respects. 219
215 Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticzng the Court, 95 HARv. L. REV 802
(1982).
216 See id. at 813-14. Rather than including Ins own lengthy discussion of Public
Choice Theory, Easterbrook relies on Dennis Mueller's treatment of the subject. See
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHoIcE (1979). Similar avoidance is appropriate m this
Article; Easterbrook's analysis is sufficient to understand the Court's confusioXi m the
affirmative action cases.
217 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Fnckey, The Junsprudence of Public owice, 65
TEX. L. REV. 873, 901 (1987). This article updates Easterbrook's in some respects and
addresses several attempts to apply Public Choice Theory to the judicial and legislative
processes.
218 Easterbrook characterizes such criticism of the Court as "in some
circumstanes ... worthless." Easterbrook, supra note 215, at 803. His summary of the
major theories of commentators on inconsistency acknowledges that the various flaws they
identify m Supreme Court decisionmaking do m fact exist, but implies that all these analyses
recognize results rather than causes. Id. at 804-11. The article recognizes, however, that
individual Justices are properly criticized for being inconsistent. Id. at 803. Tlus does not
appear to be a significant issue m the affirmative action cases, or even equal protection
generally. Individual Justices are fairly consistent; the search for common ground, or the
false assertion of a majority, however, has rendered their collective decisions inconsistent.
219 Id. at 804-11. For example, Easterbrook rebuts the notion that "skeletal opimons"
would result in more agreement among the Justices. Id. at 808-09. He points out that
lengthy opinions may present more "targets" for dissenters, but they also provide more
guidance to lower courts and attorneys. Brief, conclusory opinions only suppress the results
of disagreement to create an illusion of group agreement.
If in Richmond the majority had merely stated that the city's set-aside did not satisfy
strict scrutiny, it would presumably have garnered the support of five Justices for all
portions (all Justices voting to strike down the program except Justice Stevens). See supra
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Easterbrook's diagnosis is that the Supreme Court, and by implication, any
multimember court, suffers from the flaws inherent in collective decision-
making: "Inconsistency is inevitable, in the strong sense of that word, no
matter how much the Justices may disregard their own preferences, no matter
how carefully they may approach their tasks, no matter how skilled they may
be." 220 This conclusion is rooted m his application of Arrow's Impossibility
Theorem221 to legal decisionmaking. In essence, Arrow's Theorem proves that
no voting system can meet each of five conditions simultaneously. 222
Easterbrook's theory then establishes that four of those conditions necessarily
apply to appellate decisionmaking in which at least three principled choices are
notes 69-71 and accompanying text. This would merely have prevented the rest of the
world from learning about the Court's internal disagreement about the meaning or
application of that standard until some future case in which votes would shift. The various
opinions of R'chmond are messy, but at least they help observers recognize the lack of clear
agreement on this issue.
220 Easterbrook, supra note 215, at 813.
221 KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). As
explained in Easterbrook's article and in more recent works, such as Farber and Frickey's
treatment of public choice in legal analysis, see supra note 217, Arrow's Theorem reveals a
fundamental but little recognized aspect of legal reasoning. It is that the group dynxmics of
a judicial body do not differ significantly from those of a policy making body. While we are
socialized to accept and expect bargain and compromise in the policy making sphere, we
are less comfortable with it in the legal sphere. The combination of ambiguous precedents
of uncertain force, our profession's unexceeded skill at presenting (at least) three sides of a
two-sided question, and the inevitable compromises that result from deciding "law" as we
do "policy," on majority votes in which two possible outcomes may conceal a multiplicity
of reasons for those outcomes, all suggest that we may be lucky to have as much coherence
as now exists.
222 As summarized by Easterbrook, the five conditions are:
(1) Unanimity: If all people entitled to a say in the decision prefer one option to
another, that option prevails.
(2) Nondictatorship: No one person's views can control the outcome in every
case.
(3) Range: The system must allow every ranking of admissible choices, and there
must be at least three admissible choices with no other institution to declare choices or
rankings out of bounds at the start.
(4) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The choice between options A and B
depends solely on the comparison of those two.
(5) Transitivity: If the collective decision selects A over B and B over C, it also
must select A over C. This is the requirement of logical consistency.
Easterbrook, supra note 215, at 823. See also ALFRED F. MACKAY, ARROW'S THEOREm,
THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1980).
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available and may be ranked in any order.223 The fifth condition, logical
consistency, therefore, cannot be satisfied. 224 Issues such as affirmative action,
of course, present more than three principled choices; the existence of eight
different views in richmond suggests the extent of the inevitable deadlocks. 225
Much of Easterbrook's analysis concerns those paradoxes of voting that
illustrate the inherent inconsistency of group judicial decisionmaking. One
problem is "cycling." This occurs where Justices hold three or more legal
conclusions, no one of which has majority support, which they rank in different
orders of preference (multi-peaked preferences). In this setting, stability is
impossible because a majority will reject each conclusion. 226 A second problem
is path dependence, in which the final result of a series of decisions depends on
the order in which the decisions are made.227 Judge Easterbrook explained the
mischievous relationship of path dependence and precedent: "Majority voting
plus stare decisis is thus a formula under which the Court may produce any
outcome favored by any number of Justices, however small, even though a
majority of Justices would reject that rule if they could do so on the basis of
first principles." 228 Finally, strategic voting, the conscious decision to deviate
from one's. preferences to avoid the least favored result, creates its own
irreconcilable results.229 The article argues that such voting .is not improper,
but notes that its use is governed by no consistent principle and that one effect
223 Easterbrook, supra note 215, at 824-30.
224 Id. at 830-31.
225 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
226 See Easterbrook, supra note 215, at 815-17 Easterbrook's example is based on
three different views of the meaning of the Establishment Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. I,
cl. 1. He proves that if the Justices rank their preferences differently, no stable position can
result, and that decisions will depend more on the fortuity of the particular questions
presented than on a coherent understanding of the pertinent legal principles. He pointedly
notes that such instability is not limited to plurality decisions, but also applies to cases in
which a majority of the Court acquiesces in one group's views, a situation that appears to be
present in both Richmond and Metro. See znfra notes 249-69 and accompanying text.
2 27 Id. at 817-21. In this section, Judge Easterbrook explains that notwithstanding all
of the positive aspects of stare decisis, id. at 817, see also supra note 163 and
accompanying text, it does not work where there are more than two credible legal theories
that may apply, id. at 817-19. Because different groups of Justices will find different
controlling principles in the precedents as well as in the cases before them, decisions can be
consistent and inconsistent with precedent at the same time. Easterbrook's idea applies
equally as well to the affirmative action area. See infra Part III.C.
228 Easterbrook, supra note 215, at 819. One of Easterbrook's examples is Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Easterbrook, supra note 215, at 819 n.41. As shown below,
Apodaca provides a striking example of the sort of "nonlaw" law that emerges from the
affirmative action cases. See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
229 Easterbrook, supra note 215, at 821-22.
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is that results are manipulated in an erratic fashion.2 °
Legal training and culture are at odds with the notion that courts act
through a majoritarlan voting mechanism, but that is the reality of our appellate
system. Judges are not isolated scholars who announce "law" when the group,
as a whole, is convinced of the soundness of a particular constitutional
theory. 231 Instead, courts decide those cases that come to them and announce
decisions whenever a majority-five on the Supreme Court-agree on a
judgment. With that announcement, the views of the Justices on the results and
reasoning are effectively frozen, perhaps to be revisited m another future case
presenting the same or similar issues. If all of the Justices agree, the issue is
probably resolved for a lengthy period and the myth of group deliberation is
maintained. If a majority clearly agrees in all key respects, the issue is probably
resolved for a period of moderate length and the myth of "the law" is tarnished
only to the extent that it must acknowledge the existence of differing views. 232
If no majority agrees, however, the issue is likely to be considered still open,
and criticism of the Court as incompetent and incoherent is likely to increase.
Easterbrook's argument, at bottom, is that such criticism is unfair. It is fairly
easy for the Court to render a coherent decision, consistent with past cases,
when there is only one issue with two possible conclusions. When there are
multiple issues, the likelihood of agreement by a critical mass of Justices
diminishes rapidly. This may be one reason for the increase in plurality or
otherwise unclear decisions by the Court since 1970.233 Whether due to an
increase in cases with three or more possible conclusions or simply to changes
230 Easterbrook points out that both stare decisis and compromise to achieve a majority
opinion, the two approaches most often urged to prevent judicial gridlock, are themselves
forms of strategic voting. Id. at 821-22. He then makes a series of points that reveal the
impossibility of developing a coherent principle for reaching principled decisions in this
area. Id. at 822. In short, no principled rules are discoverable even at this abstract level,
and stare decisis provides no escape, as its role in strategic voting equals its role in path
dependence. Accordingly, Easterbrook argues for weakening stare decisis when more than
two decision paths are credible, and suggests that the Court has done this as a practical
matter. Id. at 820-21 & n.43.
231 That is the theory of the continental model. See supra note 156 and accompanying
text. It is no more than a myth about our system.
232 If such differing views were to disappear immediately upon the issuance of the
decision, majority opinions would tend to take on the firmness of unanimous opinions. It
seems likely, however, that persistent dissents, see supra notes 211-12 and accompanying
text, and changes on the Court mean that split courts only resolve the matter temporarily.
While this is apparently more true of controversial matters, such as the nearly annual
abortion case or affirmative action, the point remains that even five is not a solid majority
on the modern Supreme Court.
233 See supra notes 164, 182 and accompanying text.
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in Court membership that rendered agreement on a single resolution less likely,
Easterbrook's theory explains much of the problem.
Constitutional criminal procedure provides one example of Easterbrook's
theory at work. Many of the cases considered by the Court in the several
decades before 1970 presented fairly stark questions concerning the
incorporation doctrine, the application of the Bill of Rights to the states.23 4 For
example, in 1967 the Court decided Duncan v. Louisiana,23 5 in which it held
that the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial applies to the states. The fact
that the jury is fundamental to our nation's criminal justice system permitted a
clear majority.23 6
By 1970 most of the relatively straightforward incorporation questions had
been answered and the cases then coming before the Court presented more
subtle questions. Following Duncan, the Court had to determine whether the
jury trial right applies in petty cases, whether a jury necessarily requires twelve
members, and if not, how many members are required, whether a jury must
return a unanimous verdict (and if not, what sort of margin is required), and
whether a smaller than twelve person jury may return a nonunanlmous verdict,
and so on.2 7 One of these cases presented a classic application of Arrow's
Theorem at work. In 1972, the Court considered the constitutionality of
Oregon's use of nonunanimous juries m criminal cases.23 8 Four Justices voted
23 4 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 44-
73 (2d ed. 1992) (describing incorporation theories and their application from the 1940s
through the 1960s).
235 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
236 Id. at 148-54. Duncan reveals the complexity of the problems m this area. On one
level, the case is simple, as it presents one issue-whether the Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth
Amendment applies to state criminal trials-and seven Justices concluded that it does apply.
However, two different theories support incorporation: "total incorporation," which was
explained in a concurring opinion for Justices Black and Douglas, id. at 162-71, and the
majority's "selective incorporation," which had the support of Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Brennan, White, Fortas, and Marshall, rd." at 148-49 & n.14. Even tis majority
was to some extent illusory. Justice Fortas accepted selective incorporation in theory but
challenged the notion that all aspects of the federal and state jury trial rights are necessarily
identical. Id. at 211-15 (concurring in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) and Duncan).
Justice Fortas's one Justice theory that was not necessary to the decision m Duncan became
a dispositive one Justice theory several years later. See znfra notes 238-41 and
accompanying text.
237 E.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (whether five jurors are too few);
Taylor v. Lousana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (composition of the jury pool); Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (whether unammous juries are required); Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (whether twelve jurors are necessary); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66 (1969) (which cases are criminal for purposes of the Sixth Amendment).
238 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
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to uphold the system, concluding that there -is no Sixth Amendment
requirement that juries be unanimous. Four other Justices voted to overturn the
system, reasoning that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal juries to return
unanimous verdicts.239 Each theory finds support in the history of the
amendment and its underlying policies, and each theory is consistent with the
notion that the Sixth Amendment grants the same rights to federal and state
defendants, as required by the incorporation theories followed m Duncan.240
Justice Powell refused to accept the latter notion, however. He concluded that
the Sixth Amendment should be interpreted to require unanimous juries m
federal cases, but that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause-the
vehicle for the incorporation doctrine-is more flexible and permits non-
unanimous state juries, as long as they are consistent with fundamental
fairness.241
What is the law in this area? It depends on how one asks the question, and
356 (1972).
239 The lineup in Apodaca was as follows: Justice White issued a plurality opinion for
himself, Cief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, which demed that the
Sixth Amendment imposed any requirement of unanimity. Apodcaca, 406 U.S. at 405-14.
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart dissented m a series of short opinions m
both Johnson and Apodaca. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 380 (Douglas, L, with Brennan, L, and
Marshall, J., dissenting), 395 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting), 397 (Stewart, J.,
with Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting), 399 (Marshall, J., with Brennan J., and
Marshall, J., dissenting) (also incorporating by reference the dissents of Douglas, J.,
Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., in Johnson). Justice Powell constituted the fifth vote to
uphold the Oregon system, but did so under his own theory. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 366
(concurring); Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (concurring); see znfra note 241 and accompanying
text. 24 0 See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
241 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 369-77. Thus, Justice Powell's vote to uphold
Apodaca's conviction rendered Justice White's four Justice opinion a plurality opinion
and the various opinions opposing non-unaunnoUs juries mere dissents. To the extent
that the question was whether Apodaca was denied a constitutional right to a
unanimous jury verdict, this result seems correct, given the views of five Justices. But
if the question were instead whether the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous juries,
Justice Powell presumably would have joined his dissenting colleagues. There is no
reason that the question could not have been so formulated, given the fact that the
incorporation doctrine was settled by 1972, and only occasional opinions, such as
Justice Fortas's concurrence in Duncan, see supra note 236, challenged the notion that
incorporation requires identical guarantees in the federal and state criminal Justice
systems. In short, eight Justices accepted the full application of the Sixth Amendment
to Apodaca's criminal prosecution, but they split evenly on its meaning. Thus, Justice
Powell's adherence to a legal position thought to have been discarded had the effect of
creating an anomalous result and a paradoxical view of constitutional law.
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the answer is logically and inescapably inconsistent..Eight Justices believed that
the Sixth Amendment applies equally in state and federal cases; five Justices
believed that the Sixth Amendment requires federal juries to be unanimous; and
five Justices believed that the Sixth Amendment does not require state juries to
be unanimous. Each Justice agreed with two of these propositions and
disagreed with a third. In keeping with Easterbrook's interpretation of Arrow's
Theorem, the three propositions cannot all be correct as a matter of logic. Yet
each proposition is correct as a matter of Supreme Court doctrine, which makes
each proposition "law" to such important segments of society as state and
federal judges, legal publishers, and bar examiners.
Easterbrook's theories of the inevitability of this kind of doctrinal chaos are
not beyond dispute. Komhauser and Sager's study of appellate decisionmaking
suggests that a court of conscientious judges can avoid incoherence by deciding
cases one at a time, thus avoiding the ranking of preferences, and by acting
with a shared sense of the requirements of coherence.242 This critique may be
theoretically sound, but it is at odds with the reality that led to the problem in
the first place. How can a judge avoid ranking preferences when that is an
integral paft of the process of weighing alternatives? 243 A common
understanding of and commitment to coherence might minimize the problem,
but it seems unlikely that such an understanding could exist in the face of the
sorts of fundamental disagreements that result in paradoxical decisions.
242 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacdang the Count, 96 YALE L.J.
82, 107 n.37 & 112-116 (1986); see also Rogers, supra note 208, at 467-68 (noting both
views and suggesting that Kornhauser and Sager conclude that the Court can be consistent
but not sensible).
243 At bottom, this criticism seems to be that Easterbrook erroneously assumes that
Justices vote separately on each issue. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 242, at 115. It may
be that Justices act in a more holistic fashion, as'the authors suggest, and that they are
sufficiently aware of the need for coherency to limit their freebooting. But on a closely split
Court it takes only one free thinker to destroy coherency, as Justices Powell, Stevens, and
Scalia have repeatedly proved. Perhaps more importantly, it would only cover up the
tension. It may take no unusual degree of self-control for a Justice to rem in his or her
individual views when they will make no difference in the outcome of the case before the
Court. But it would be remarkable for Justices to do so in cases in which such voting would
result m what they believe to be an erroneous judgment. This was Rogers's point-Justices
almost always vote to affirm or reverse on their own analysis of a case, regardless of the
views of a majority. Rogers, supra note 208, at 440. If Justices are going to reveal their
own views in cases in which they make a difference, the only result of suppressing those
views in other cases would be to fool the rest of the world about the likely outcome of
Supreme Court litigation.
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C. Theory and Reality in Affirmative Action
The real relevance of public choice reflections on the judicial process is not
in demonstrating the inevitability of Arrow's Theorem or any other form of
jurisprudential deadlock. It is that the benefits of our appellate system-neither
wholly British nor continental, based on precedent but not strictly bound by it,
and sometimes dependent on the accuracy of inferences drawn from several
different opimons-do not come without costs. Some of those costs relate to the
difficulty of deriving a uniform vision of law. Affirmative action is one area in
which these particular costs have bepn relatively high.
Equal protection cases generally, and affirmative action cases particularly,
are likely to continue to present incoherency problems. Equal protection cases
in general will do so because the Court must interpret and then apply the
phrase "equal protection of the laws," which is certainly susceptible of more
than two principled meanings, and probably more than nine. Affirmative action
cases in particular will do so for two additional reasons. First, affirmative
action is exceptionally controversial to the Justices, as it is to the general
public. In this already sensitive area, the numerous issues that arise in
affirmative action cases provide many opportunities for disagreement. Even if
the Justices agree about many features of a program, they are likely to disagree
sharply over others. For example, the Justices could agree that a remedial
objective is worth pursuing, yet disagree about appropriate methods of
achieving it. The Court is hampered in resolving such questions by the fact that
the Justices seem to be unable to avoid the influence of their own policy views
about affirmative action. 244 Whether it is possible to avoid such influence is a
fair question, but it seems likely that the Justices have given in to the
temptation more than is necessary or wise. Reliance on extra-legal values may
not be troublesome when the values are shared both within the Court and
between the Court and a clear majority of the public.245 This appears to be the
244 This point is central to one criticism of the Court's general decisionmaking
practices. Note, Plurality Declsaons, supra note 154, at 1128. The author suggests that a key
cause of the increasing number of plurality decisions is the Court's "value-laden 'substantive
reasoning.'" Id. at 1128. Of course, whether this is good, bad, or inevitable is problematic.
If all of the Justices could put their own policy views out of their minds and agree on the
appropriate factors to consider in reviewing affirmative action cases, it is likely that clearer
decisions would result. But in the absence of agreement on the relevant factors, agreement
on the irrelevance of policy beliefs would probably do little to achieve coherence.
245 The Note discussed m the preceding footnote suggests that such an agreement over
values was evident in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and the era and doctrine
that arose from it. Note, Plurality Deczsions, supra note 154, at 1141. This seems incorrect.
What made the doctrine so remarkable, and what accounts for its reputation in legal circles
today, is the fact that the Court forced its substantive values on an unwilling society. See
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case, for example, with respect to invidious racial discrimination. 246 Yet when
agreement is impossible, and especially when the disagreements are as strong
as they are on the subject of affirmative action, the tension within the Court is
more likely to lead to digging opposing trenches than to building a common
foundation.
Second, the Court appears to be committed to examining affirmative action
plans under the tiers of review, a framework designed to respond to invidious
discrimination. It may be that the use of tiers of review provides some
protection from the corrosive effects of open disagreement over affirmative
action as a matter of policy, but the artificial nature of the standards of review
hinders rather than aids analysis when subtle and necessarily fact-laden issues
are important. Whatever good results from the emotional distance provided by
the tiers of review247 is more than outweighed by the disadvantages of their
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economrc
Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 324, 381 (1985) (accepting a role as "censor of
the reasonableness of all laws"); Thomas Reed Powell, The Judiciality of Mimnumn-Wage
Legislation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 545, 547-52 (1924) (setting out Supreme Court history to
show that decisions denying regulatory authority were inposed by the personal beliefs of
the Justices). That reputation may be overdrawn. Professor Tribe makes the usual criticisms
of Lochner but notes that at the time the Justices' views "were far from aberrant or
peculiarly retrogressive." TRiBE, supra note 9, at 568; see also Curre, supra, at 378-82
(arguing that Lochner nposed rigid scrutiny of economic legislation but that the Court did
uphold much legislation). Attempts to draw a contemporary analogue are obstructed by the
very substantive reasoning that the author identifies as the culprit. Aggressive judicial
review of affirmative action can be criticized as Lochnenzng for its willingness to overturn
decisions by politically elected officials. It can also be defended as distinct from
Lodnenzng and instead premised on decades of careful judicial scrutiny of all race-based
governmental action.
246 There can be little doubt about this aspect of equal protection law, at least.
Opponents of affirmative action often make a point of stressing opposition to invidious racial
discrimination. E.g., BORK, supra note 19, at 77 ("The end of state-mandated segregation
was the greatest moral triumph constitutional law had ever produced."); Devins, supra note
10, at 28-29 ("no one disagrees" that discrimination harmful to racial minorities is
prohibited); Lee, supra note 34, at 275 ("there was simply no room for legitimate
disagreement" on official racial discrimination); Reynolds, supra note 22, at 1007 (strong
statement in opposition to racial inequality). Accordingly, there is no noticeable criticism of
the Court when the Justices assume that invidious discrimination is reprehensible and allow
this view to affect their opinions.
247 Whether any good really results from the tiers is debatable. In an abstract sense,
the tiers allow Justices to put their arguments into "process" form, thereby transforming
merits arguments into "sufficiency of showing" arguments that allow the author of an
opinion to imply that a different judgment might have resulted if the government had made
a stronger (or, from the other side, weaker) defense of the law. Nevertheless, cases such as
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wooden and inept design. The traditional tiers of equal protection review
simply do not provide an appropriate methodology for examining intentional
race-conscious governmental action that is benign rather than malign.248
Richond undermine the implication. It is hard to believe that most of the Justices voting to
overturn the ordinance would have been persuaded to uphold it by greater evidence. See
supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. Of course, it would not take "most of the
Justices" to reach a different result, as Metro proves, see supra notes 102-03 and
accompanying text, and the majority m that case is equally suspect of using the standard of
review to obscure the range of views within the Court. See infra notes 261-69 and
accompanying text.
248 This seems in part to result from the cross-signals that at least some forms of race-
conscious action send. All racial classifications are potentially troublesome, if only because
in the past invidious discrimination was occasionally justified by claims that it was protective
or otherwise benign. For example, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Court
upheld Louisiana's requirement that railroad.accommodations be segregated, noting that the
state acted to preserve the peace and good relations between the races and not out of a belief
in white supremacy. Id. at 544-552; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684
(1973) ("Traditionally,... [sex].discnmination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic
paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal but in a cage.")
(plurality decision); cf. Umversity of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978)
(protective barriers reinforce racial stereotypes); DeFums v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A segregated admission process creates suggestions of
stigma and caste no less than a segregated classroom, and in the end it may produce that
result despite its contrary intentions."). Moreover, racial Justice is necessarily rough.
Whether or not overinclusion in affirmative action is really a serious problem,
underinclusion plainly is, and some observers believe such programs impose a double
hardship on those erroneously excluded. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 3, at 152-54 (many
groups other than African Americans have suffered from discrmination). Actions to remedy
past wrongs of racial discrimination nevertheless have highly appropriate purposes under
ends/means analysis, and actions to benefit minority or other disadvantaged groups are not
"suspicious" in the sense that courts must scrutinize governmental action to protect against
prejudice or abuse by the political majority.
The two primary tiers of review, rational basis and strict scrutiny, are ill-equipped to
deal with thins ambiguous nature of affirmative action. The tiers were designed to respond to
the far less ambiguous archetypes of routine legislative enactments and other actions
apparently prensed on inproper motivations. Intermediate scrutiny therefore seems to be a
logical alternative, as the Metro majority asserted. But see supra note 109 and
accompanying text (suggesting that the majority's scrutiny was in fact less than intermediate
scrutiny). Intermediate scrutiny, however, is less a tier of review than a conclusion that a
case-by-case examination of the various factors for and against the governmental action is
necessary. This seems to be Justice Stevens's approach, which may explain his willingness
to support the intermediate scrutiny opinion in Metro. To the extent intermediate scrutiny is
in fact a tier, it is appropriate in such cases. See infra notes 271-72, 283-84 and
accompanying text.
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The various opinions in Richmond and Metro exemplify two of the
Supreme Court's methods of dealing with its inability to derive a coherent
theory of constitutional interpretation. Each method uses a form of
smokescreen. The first method is the false majority, in which a majority of the
Court simply pretends that there is agreement that does not in fact exist. Here
the Court in effect allows each decision to stand on its own, regardless of
whether any doctrine emerges from the line of decisions. The second method is
the overgeneralized conclusion, in which the Court talks at a level of
abstraction that a majority does support, but which hides deep disagreements
about the application of the general conclusion.
The first method is illustrated by the peculiar federal/state dichotomy that
emerges from Richmond and Metro. Only one Justice seemed to believe that
the Constitution distinguishes between state and federal authority in this area.
Yet a plurality in Richmond and a majority largely made up of different Justices
in Metro relied on that distinction to -wrangle out from under inconvenient
precedents. 249 The result was apparently overwhelming support that is non-
existent in fact. The true pluralitY25 0 of Richmond only- seemed to become
settled in Metro. As revealed by the dissents in that case, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy recognized only the
most narrow of distinctions, one that plainly would apply strict scrutiny to most
federal affirmative action programs. 25 1 To these Justices, the distinction they
accepted in Richmond- was simply a device to justify deviating from Fullilove's
more accommodating approach. Metro provided another opportunity to limit
Fullilove to its facts, but circumstances conspired to force this group of Justices
to do so in dissent. The Metro majority, however, was not any more committed
to the federal/state distinction. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun have
consistently urged the application of intermediate scrutiny to both state and
federal programs.25 2 In Richmond their dissent nowhere acquiesced in the
majority's distinction, and in fact argued that the Richmond plan's similarity to
the program upheld in Fullilove virtually proved the validity of the City's
249 See Metro, 497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990); Richmond, 488 U.S. 469, 486-93
(1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 521-24 (Scalia, I., concurring); supra notes 66-68, 104
and accompanying text.250 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
251 Metro, 497 U.S. 457, 602-10 (1990). Justice O'Connor's theme permitted no
exceptions: "The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection binds the Federal Government
as it does the States, and no lower level of scrutiny applies to the Federal Government's use
of race classifications." Id. at 604.
252 See, e.g., Metro, 497 U.S. at 564-65; Richmond, 488 U.S. at 535; Wygant v.
Jackson Dd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301-02 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutzmck, 448 U.S. 448,
517-19 (1981); Umversity of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (all three
Justices, and occasonally Justice White, supporting use of intermediate scrutiny).
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plan.25 3 They would probably have preferred to overrule Richmond, but
reliance on the distinction in Metro apparently allowed them to attract Justice
White, whose vote was necessary to uphold the FCC's programs. 254
In all likelihood only Justice White believed in the federal/state line.25 5 The
result is the same as in Apodaca, the unanimous jury trial case:
(1) Eight Justices believed that the Equal Protection Clause applies equally
to the federal and state governments;
(2) five Justices believed that intermediate scrutiny applies to federal
affirmative action programs;256
(3) five Justices believed that strict scrutiny applies to state affirmative
action programs.
As in Apodaca, each Justice agreed with two of these propositions but
disagreed with a third, even though the three propositions cannot all be correct
as a matter of logic. The federal/state line that arises from the second and third
propositions is "the law." It prevails- over the first proposition essentially
because cases involve either federal or state programs, and therefore do not
provide a vehicle for the Court to issue a holding on the first proposition.25 7
The Supreme Court's second method of obscuring inconsistency is to use
253 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 530-36. Fulliove is cited at various points in the dissenting
opinion, often in direct response to the majority's questions about the ends/means fit of the
racial set-aside. See, e.g., zd. at 536 (noting that Fulliove found the interest to be
sufficient); id. at 539 (noting the extent of the governmental justification required by
Fulilove); id. at 543 (noting that Fullilove upheld Congress's conclusion that past
discrimination caused racial unbalance in contracting).
254 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
255 Only Justice White joined opinions accepting the distinction in both cases. Justice
White was also one of only two Justices not to issue an opinion in at least one of the cases
(Chief Justice Rehnquist was the other). White's silence may weaken our coifidence in his
commitment to all of the words in the opinions he joined, but the absence of other evidence
leaves us with no alternatives.
256 Justice Stevens is placed in this second group. This distorts to some extent his
umque "reasonableness" approach to all equal protection cases. See Metro, 497 U.S. at
601-02 & n.3; Richmond, 488 U.S. at 514-15 & nn.5-6; see also supra note 136 and
accompanying text. Still, Is analysis seems to be in effect the sort of case-by-case approach
intermediate scrutiny requires, see supra note 48, and he did explicitly join the majority
opinion in Metro that espoused intermediate scrutiny for federal programs. Metro, 497 U.S.
at 602.
25 7 Drawing the line between federal and state action in this regard is not always easy.
Fullilove, after all, involved federal funding of construction by state and local governments.
See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-54. Cases after Richmond and Metro have upheld similar
state set-asides under federal authorization. See, e.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v.
Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1991); Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Blanchard, 761 F
Supp. 1303, 1313-15 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
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abstractions to paper over the differences among the Justices. If the first
method generates confusion because the Court has in effect reached a decision
without majority support for a particular rationale, this second method
generates confusion because the Court asserts a legal conclusion that is too
general to be of much use in deciding cases.
In Richmond, for example, the Court concluded that the city's ordinance
was invalid because it was not sufficiently tailored to a compelling
governmental interest to withstand strict scrutiny 258 It Is likely that different
Justices were concerned with different failings of the ordinance. For example,
some Justices may have considered the city's failure to consider alternatives to
be more troublesome than the harm to "innocent" third parties or the inclusion
of groups not subject to past discrimination. 259 It may be that any one of these
failings would have been enough to convince a majority to strike down the
program, but it also may be that some or all were significant only in context
with the others. The important point, -however, is that one cannot tell from
studying the decision because the majority used a totality of the circumstances
approach to reach an abstract conclusion concerning the ends/means fit. The
opinion employed nebulous terminology and then remarked on a number of
aspects of the Richmond ordinance that one or more members of the majority
found objectionable. Once each of five Justices found something to be
objectionable enough to invalidate the program, a majority could conclude that
the program was not necessary (or narrowly tailored) to a compelling
government purpose, even if no two Justices found any single aspect to be
objectionable. The majority support for the conclusion concerning narrow
tailoring may, therefore, hide the fact that no majority agreed on the
258 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 498-511. Again, of course, only four Justices formally
supported the last portion of this discussion. See id. at 470-73. But Justice Scalia's strong
support of rigorous strict scrutiny, see id. at 520-21, 524-25, indicates that although Justice
O'Connor's opimon speaks for only four Justices, its use of strict scrutiny makes it a false
plurality. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (Justice Scalia's views) and supra
text accompanying note 190 (explanation of false plurality).
259 Different Justices seem to be concerned about different aspects of affirmative
action programs. See, e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421, 489, 497-98, 499-500 (1986) (Justices White and O'Connor separately dissent,
finding the affirmative action plan too rigid); itd. at 500 (Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist dissent, emphasizing the fact that the program benefited individuals not
themselves proven to be victims of the employer's discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281-83 (1986) (emphasizing the relevance of the burden mposed
on "innocent" persons); Fullilove v. Klutzmck, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern about legislative attempts to remedy past discrimination).
The various points the Justices identify as central largely track the various issues raised in
such cases. See supra Part I.B.
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significance of any particular aspect of the program. The lawyers reading
Richmond do not know, and more importantly, those state and local officials
charged with drafting affirmative action plans do not know, which aspects of
the Richmond plan were most m need of correction, or if some aspects may be
included in new plans that avoid other problems. In this sense, Richmond
presents a constructive plurality, a majority opinion that in reality has the effect
of a plurality opinion.260
This form of over abstraction is also present in Metro, with the same
result. The Court's holding with respect to the standard of review261 seems
over confident given Justice Stevens's doubts on the use of any general
standard of review. 262 A more accurate description of the views of the critical
mass of five Justices would be: four Justices believed intermediate scrutiny
applies to congressionally mandated benign race-conscious measures, and one
more believed that the unusual nature of the FCC's diversity policies brings
them "within the extremely narrow category of governmental decisions for
which racial or ethnic heritage may provide a rational basis for differential
treatment." 263 The general assertion that federal plans are subject to
intermediate scrutiny also seems to misread Justice Stevens's attitude toward
affirmative action. His dissent in Fulliove and explicit endorsement of forward-
looking over backward-looking plans in both Richmond and Metro indicate that
he would be reluctant to be so deferential to federal remedial plans. 264
260 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
261 Metro, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990); see supra text accompanying note 102.
262 See supra notes 136, 256 and accompanying text. Thus, Justice Stevens made it a
constructive plurality. If he had declined to sign the majority opinion, which would seem to
be an action more consistent with his views, that opimon would have been a plurality
opinion. It would be an illegitimate plurality, see supra note 191 and accompanying text, as
it would reflect Stevens's unwillingness to bend to Fullilove or to the use of the tiers of
review in such cases. As it is, however, he was both a critical fifth member of a majority
with which he disagreed m part, and the author of a, doctrinal concurrence. His concurrence
in Richmond was also doctrinal. Iustice Scalia's concurrence in that case was both expansive
and emphatic, and Justice Kennedy's concurrence was a limiting concurrence. See generally
supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
263 Metro, 497 U.S. at 601 (footnote omitted).
264 See Metro, 497 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, I., concurring) ("I endorse this focus on the
future benefit, rather than the remedial justification, of such decisions.") (footnote omitted);
Richmond, 488 U.S. 469, 511-14 & nn.1-3 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
difficulty of prescribing legislative remedies and variety of other appropriate justifications
for race-based decisionmalung); Fullilove v. Klutzmck, 448 U.S. 448, 540-41, 548-54
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating an extremely skeptical attitude toward legislative
remedies based on race); see supra notes 81, 115, 131 and accompanying text. One curious
aspect of Justice Stevens's preference for forward-looking programs is that forward-looking
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Finally, there are reasons to question the extent-of the majority's agreement
in applying the intermediate scrutiny standard. Much as the Richmond majority
opinion set out the standard and then critically described aspects of the set-
aside, much of the Metro majority opinion simply described aspects of the FCC
policies that support the Court's general conclusion.265 The extended analyses
of the Commission's special responsibilities in governing use of broadcast
frequencies, the constitutional difficulties of directly regulating broadcast
content, the FCC's history of attempting to achieve diversity through other
methods, the fact that the policies are flexible rather than rigid quotas, and the
conclusion that few persons can be characterized as burdened, all add up to
another totality of the circumstances test.266 As in Richmond, it is virtually
impossible to determine which, if any, of these factors was critical to the
Court's conclusion. Given some of Justice White's prior decisions, it is likely
that the extent of FCC authority over broadcasting and the minimal hardship
were both important,267 and taking Justice Stevens at his word, the utility of
federal programs would seem to have the support of a majority of the 1990 Court, while
remedial federal programs would not, even though it appears that all eight of the other
justices favored remedial justifications.
265 See Metro, 497 US. at 566, 568-71, 574, 577-82, 586-96. Not surprisingly, both
sides relied on law office legislative and administrative history; cf. i. at 610-12, 615, 618-
19, 622-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Each of these opinions wrongly implies that all of
the factors pertinent to the Court's decision point m one direction. The sides disagreed about
that direction, of course, and only m this fashion did the Court acknowledge that the need
for and effectiveness of such programs are questions on which the Congress, the FCC, and
the public are all closely split.
266 These were the majority's conclusions. As suggested in the previous footnote, the
dissenters sorted different facts and reached different conclusions. Two examples reveal the
extent of the differences. First, the majority noted Congress's continuing supervision and
the availability of review to ensure that the policies would be applied correctly and not
maintained longer than necessary. Metro, 497 U.S. at 594-96. The dissenters argued that
the FCC had never seriously reviewed its policies and that Congress had prevented its only
attempt to do so. Id. at 625-28. Second, Ihe majority found the burdens unposed by the
policies to be minor and rarely imposed. Id. at 596-600. The dissenters found the burdens
to be significant, noting that the distress sale program is closed to nonmmorities and that
race is dispositive in many comparative hearings. Id. at 630-31.
Open use of a totality of the circumstances test would not necessarily result in
unanimous or even clear majority opinions, as such differences would remain. It would,
however, make it easier for the Justices to describe what they were doing and for readers to
understand the nature of the Court's response to affirmative action.
2 67 justice White generally acknowledges broad regulatory authority in the
broadcasting area. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402-08
(1984) Coming dissents supporting broad view of regulatory authority); FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (authoring majority opinion generally supportive of
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these policies and the absence of a stigma attaching to those disadvantaged were
probably significant.268 Justice White had the good sense to remain mute, and
Justice Stevens's opinon overlapped very little with the majority opinion he
signed.
But even if we knew the importance of the cited factors to these two
Justices, we still would not know their importance to the other majority
Justices. We do not know, for example, the importance to Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun of the FCC's attempts to reach its objectives through
other means. Accordingly, we cannot gauge the Court's response to a federal
program that met all of the factors except for consideration of other means. The
same is true for each of the other factors. We know only two things: together,
all these factors satisfied a majority of the Court, and the loss of support from
any one of the Justices would mean that the law will be struck down, absent an
uncharacteristic decision by one of the dissenters to adhere to Metro.269
IV. CONCLUSION
There are no solutions to the problem of inconsistency If Judge
Easterbrook is correct, incoherence is inevitable, but even if he is wrong, the
fact that incoherence is so prevalent m certain settings but not in others
suggests that it is not solely the result of thick-headed judges intent on
imposing their world views on the nation. Nevertheless, some observations can
be made about attempts to lessen doctrinal incoherence.
broad authority despite denying power m the particular case); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (authoring unanimous opinion upholding fairness doctrine and
prescribing broad authority over broadcasters).
Justice White also appears to be more troubled than most of his colleagues by
affirmative action programs that impose hardships on innocent non-minorities. See, e.g.,
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v: EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 499-500 (1986)
(dissenting in statutory case because the burden on innocent workers would be unfair);
Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 531 (1986)
(dissenting m statutory case because of hardship to white employees); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1986) (writing separately to note that racially
conscious layoffs of innocent white teachers are unconstitutional).
268 See Metro, 497 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring); Richmond, 488 U.S. 469,
512, 516-17 (1989).
269 The several changes on the Court since 1990 only exacerbate the problem of
making predictions. With three members of the Metro majority now gone, it is unrealistic to
assume that the Court will scrupulously honor its holding, let alone the implications of its
analysis. Of course, one point of this article is that it would be just about as unrealistic even
without any changes on the Court.
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When in doubt, lawyers propose balancing tests.270 Use of a balancing test
to review equal protection challenges to affirmative action plans would provide
some advantages. If carefully drafted, such a test could avoid equating
invidious and benign discrimination, and it could also provide a more
appropriate vehicle for evaluating the numerous pertinent factors that do not fit
comfortably into means-ends analysis.271 In the affirmative action area, for
example, balancing would allow the Court to recognize and weigh the benign
intentions underlying an affirmative action program without being compelled to
sacrifice careful analysis of the specific facts giving rise to the program, which
seems to be the case using the tiers of review. Balancing also makes it possible
for courts to address factors that seem to have been overlooked or dismissed m
most recent cases, such as the present disadvantages that result from past
racism and the actual effects of using race-conscious classifications as opposed
to race-neutral classifications. Balancing would also more accurately reflect
what a majority of Justices now seem to be doing. Accordingly, it would allow
2 70 A number of recent articles address balancing as a tool of constitutional
adjudication. See, e.g., T. Alexander Alemilroff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.. 943 (1987); Frank Coffin, Judicial Balancing:.The Protean Scales
of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 16 (1988); Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 319 (1992); Steven Schiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal
Scholarslup, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1983); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Tudging:
The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. Rlv. 293 (1992).
The easy criticism of balancing is that its lack of form permits judges (and scholars) to
use balancing to justify any preferred outcome. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
Despite this evident danger, balancing provides an attractive model for constitutional
analysis. In this complex area, in which so many factors seem to be pertinent to the judicial
task, there may be no other way-let alone an effective way-to formulate the role of such
factors than to place them into categories and describe the way the categories relate. Tins is
more or less what most modern balancing approaches attempt to do.
271 One example would be the purpose for implementing an affirmative action
program. As it stands after Richmond and Metro, the factors considered do not seem to
reflect the shadings and particularities that exist m real life and governmental
decisionmaking. In Richmond the working majority defined a very limited role for
affirmative action, finding that societal discrimination could not provide a basis for such
action and held the city to a high standard of proving past discrimination in the particular
industry. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493-506. The failure to meet that standard meant, in
effect, that the city could not act in a race-conscious way, no matter how limited. Some
form of balancing would allow the extent of societal discrimination and other, forward-
looking, justifications to set the parameters of race-conscious action. Perhaps a rigid quota
would not be appropriate absent the more specific findings demanded by the majority, but
the Court's effective denial of any power to provide additional help to minority businesses
in a state that refused to educate most of its African Americans old enough to manage a
business is itself unduly rigid.
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lower courts and litigants to describe the applicable decision process more
correctly.
Unfortunately, the benefits of candor may be outweighed by the fact that
balancing may be a large part of what has got the Court in its present fix.
Balancing is likely to result in the same sort of unclear totality of the
circumstances analysis that bedevils attempts to understand cases such as
Richmond and Metro. Easterbrook dismisses balancing as useless: "[l]t is
possible to prove anything you want with a kit of 'interest balancing'
tools ... .,"272 Balancing may still be appropriate in this or other areas, but it
will not end incoherence.
What might minimize incoherence is what Henry Monaghan describes as a
"transformative or longstanding precedent." 273 Such decisions take on the
mantle of constitutional bedrock, nearly on the level of constitutional text and
superior to other interpretative tools. Brown v. Board of Education274 is the
most noteworthy m the equal protection area.275 Transformative decisions help
to avoid incoherence for two reasons. First, they provide more specific content
to the open-ended clauses of the Constitution. Second, they have legitimacy
based on a nearly universal acceptance of their tenets.
Although a transformative precedent would greatly help affirmative action
analysis, there is no way to manufacture one. Instead, such precedents arise
through a series of events: all or most of the Justices agree on a decision (and
its reasoning); they then issue an opinion that transcends the specific facts of
272 Frank H. Easterbrook, Whatws So Specwl About Judges?, 61 U. CoLo. L. RaV.
773, 781 (1990). Basterbrook describes balancing tests as both a mechamsm to increase
judicial authority relative to that of the legislatures, id. at 780, and "an increasingly
common move that liberates the court from all semblance of rules," ud. at 781. See also
Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing
balancing tests as "difficult to apply and... inherently unpredictable").273 Monaghan, supra note 163, at 724.
274 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
275 It is noteworthy that although the decision is disputable in history and constitutional
theory, see, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Onginal Understanding and the Segregation
Deamon, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 56-59 (1955) (the Equal Protection Clause was not intended
to prohibit segregation); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Pnncples of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32-34 (1959) (the decision can be defended only on freedom of
association grounds), it is strongly endorsed even by those generally hostile to broad
readings of constitutional rights, see, e.g., BORK, supra note 19, at 74-84 (generally
approving the result). But see id. at 75 (a "great and correct" decision but a "very weak
opimon"). Perhaps the most noteworthy transformative precedent is Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marbury is constantly questioned on historical and theoretical
grounds, see TRIBE, supra note 9, at 25-26 & n.9, but no one takes seriously the notion that
it should be overruled.
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that case to elucidate a broader area; the Justices, lower courts, and
attorneys276 find that it works-that it allows them to derive and apply
constitutional principles in a predictable and satisfactory manner. While it
would be an overstatement to insist that such cases "just happen," there seems
to be no way to force one. The closest thing to a transformative opinion m the
affirmative action area is Justice Powell's opinion in University of California
Regents v. Bakke,277 which recognized a middle ground between a strict
constitutional prohibition of race-conscious governmental action and an
uncritical approval of rigid racial quotas. 278 The Powell opinion remains a
major source of authority for opinions on all sides of the affirmative action
debate because of Justice Powell's sensitive analysis of the issues.279 But an
opinion signed by only one member of the Court cannot truly be a
transformative precedent, especially when its reasoning can be applied in a
number of different ways.
If the Supreme Court does develop a transformative precedent in the
affirmative action area, it will probably be due to the deeply conservative
nature of the present Court. From 1969 to 1991, each new member of the
Court was more conservative than the Justice he or she replaced, 280 and the
newer Justices tend to be the most opposed to affirmative action. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and White, three of the five Justices who voted to uphold
the FCC's programs, are now gone from the Court, and President Clinton's
appointees are not likely to change the direction on this issue for at least a few
276 The public also seems to play a role here. Brown became a transformative
precedent in part because the majority of the public recognized the inequality of segregation
and more and more came to see the need to transform society in this respect.
277 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
278 Id.
27 9 Justice Powell's analysis recognized the various values potentially served by
increasing the number of minority students, but also the substantial burdens caused by a
rigid quota, including potential mtangible'harms that could unintentionally result. Id. at
305-15. Justice O'Connor's majority/plurality opinion i Richmond relies on the Powell
opinion in Bakke at several points, see Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (standard of review),
496-97 (permissible objectives), 505-06 (nature of equality guarantee), as does her dissent
in Metro, see 497 U.S. at 619 (correlation of race and behavior). The Powell opinion is also
central to the majority's analysis in Metro, which cites Justice Powell's recognition of the
first amendment values served by diversity, 497 U.S. at 568, and the importance of limits
on the program, id. at 596, 597.
280 See generally Smith, supra note 158, at 318 and passm. All Supreme Court
appointments from 1969 through 1991 were by Republican presidents. Even those Justices
often characterized as liberal replaced more liberal Justices: Justice Blackmun replaced
Justice Fortas, and Justice Stevens replaced Justice Douglas.
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more years. 281
Thus, Metro may become a historical anomaly, either overturned or
narrowed to the limits of its unusual facts. Consistent decisions by the Court
against affirmative action programs would not mean, however, that the
decisions or the body of law that emerges would be coherent. That would occur
only if the new anti-affirmative action majority were able to coalesce around a
theory that would resolve future cases and avoid the development of law by
shifting majorities-the law that results from the intersection of fundamentally
inconsistent cases. To draw on Professor Kelman's metaphor, the Court can
achieve this only if its soloists agre to perform in quintets. 282 They also must
avoid the mush-majority of "totality of the circumstances" tests unless, (1) that
is what a majority clearly believes is appropriate and, (2) the opinions are
written so as to clarify the individual and contextual significance of each factor.
The opposing majorities m Richmond and Metro could not or would not do so;
as a result, their opinions said less with each word.
The biggest reason that even a monolithic Supreme Court will not put the
affirmative action question to rest is that the Court has only the power to decide
cases, not the power to end controversies. The Court might become internally
consistent, issuing decisions based on understandable and coherent reasoning.
But society does not have a coherent attitude toward affirmative action, and the
Court can go only so far in helping it to achieve one. Thus, another way for the
Court to look at the problem is to recognize the reality of profound societal
disagreement and accept its own inability to come to a cosmic solution. Instead
of basmg decisions on a single theoretical premise, the Court should throw
away its smokescreens, acknowledge its inability to be consistent on affirmative
action, and try to decide each case that comes along as best it can.283 This may
be what some of the Justices have been trying to do,2 84 but their attempts to fit
281 President Clinton's appointment of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to replace Justice
White is not likely to change matters, other than to change the number of Justices
supporting the federal/state dichotomy from one tor zero. Given the ages of the remalmng
Justices, it is likely that a conservative majority will prevail on the Court for another ten to
fifteen years even if no more conservative Justices are appointed.
2 82 Kelman, supra note 156, at 263.
283 This would require using all available evidence and paying attention to every factor
that is deemed by any reasonable observer to be relevant to the task. As Professor Farber
suggests, "constitutional law needs no grand theoretical foundation," and is best interpreted
with the help of "every tool that comes to hand." Danel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and
the Constion, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (1988).
284 It certainly seems to be what Justice Powell was trying to do from Umversity of
Califorma Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978), through Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 269 (1986). It also seems to be the thread of Justice
Stevens's opinions in the affirmative action cases. Justice O'Connor's fact-intense and
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pragmatism into existing equal protection theory has both obscured the reality
of the process and hindered the accomplishment of its goals. This is especially
true when the Court uses strict scrutiny, for that test mandates substantial
judicial intervention. Instead, the Court should rely on common sense and
recognize that its inability to reach clear and consistent decisions suggests that
it should be more deferential to other parts of government. This would
probably result in more affirmative action programs surviving equal protection
analysis, a fact that may be unacceptable to a majority of the present Court. But
the Court's decisions to date evidence the complete failure of the logical
application of grand theory, while the more experience-based actions of the
other organs of government have not yet been proven to fail.
The message sent by the Supreme Court in the affirmative action area is
uncertainty, with a resulting need for continual reappraisal. This is probably
the most accurate message the Court could send, 285 even if it is not the one any
of us individually would choose. The doctrinal disarray is frustrating but
inevitable, given the arguments on the many issues that underlie the
controversy. The incoherence of the Court's opinions may-exacerbate doctrinal
confusion, but on balance it may be good for our system of government.
Incoherence creates more options for future cases, provides additional
opportunities for courts to find "fair" solutions in individual cases, and
engenders caution, at least by those Justices that recognize the futility of finding
the one, true principle that decides every case. But most of all, the incoherence
should not make us or the Court feel despondent. It is in the end better that the
Court send multiple and confusing cross-messages in its cases than that it send
a single, wrong message. And when lower court judges, professors, and
lawyers criticize the Court for its ramblings, and when we berate ourselves for
failing to understand the Court's attempts to reconcile its decisions, we can and
should remember that most of the Justices agree with us.
factor-rich analysis m Richmond is evidence of her support for such an approach, although
the form into winch it is applied, strict scrutiny, is at odds with this notion. Similarly, it
seems to be consistent with the pro-affirmative action Justices, if only because they rely on
intermediate scrutiny, which at bottom is a vehicle for case by case analysis.
285 Cf Novak, supra note 154, at 781 (plurality decisions indicate uncertainty and seek
additional argument); Ray, supra note 153, at 813 (when no consensus exists, further study
is better than an unsatisfactory compromise).
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